Right. SLT tells us how to operationalize and measure (via the LLC) basin volume in general for DL. It tells us about the relation between the LLC and meaningful inductive biases in the particular setting described in this post. I expect future SLT to give us meaningful predictions about inductive biases in DL in particular. 

The post is live here.

If we actually had the precision and maturity of understanding to predict this "volume" question, we'd probably (but not definitely) be able to make fundamental contributions to DL generalization theory + inductive bias research. 

Obligatory singular learning theory plug: SLT can and does make predictions about the "volume" question. There will be a post soon by @Daniel Murfet that provides a clear example of this. 

Our work on the induction bump is now out. We find several additional "hidden" transitions, including one that splits the induction bump in two: a first part where previous-token heads start forming, and a second part where the rest of the induction circuit finishes forming. 

The first substage is a type-B transition (loss changing only slightly, complexity decreasing). The second substage is a more typical type-A transition (loss decreasing, complexity increasing). We're still unclear about how to understand this type-B transition structurally. How is the model simplifying? E.g., is there some link between attention heads composing and the basin broadening? 

As a historical note / broader context, the worry about model class over-expressivity has been there in the early days of Machine Learning. There was a mistrust of large blackbox models like random forest and SVM and their unusually low test or even cross-validation loss, citing ability of the models to fit noise. Breiman frank commentary back in 2001, "Statistical Modelling: The Two Cultures", touch on this among other worries about ML models. The success of ML has turn this worry into the generalisation puzzle. Zhang et. al. 2017 being a call to arms when DL greatly exacerbated the scale and urgency of this problem.

Yeah it surprises me that Zhang et al. (2018) has had the impact it did when, like you point out, the ideas have been around for so long. Deep learning theorists like Telgarsky point to it as a clear turning point.

Naive optimism: hopefully progress towards a strong resolution to the generalisation puzzle give us understanding enough to gain control on what kind of solutions are learned. And one day we can ask for more than generalisation, like "generalise and be safe".

This I can stand behind.

I think this mostly has to do with the fact that learning theory grew up in/next to computer science where the focus is usually worst-case performance (esp. in algorithmic complexity theory). This naturally led to the mindset of uniform bounds. That and there's a bit of historical contingency: people started doing it this way, and early approaches have a habit of sticking.