I sent a link to Dennett. He wrote back:

"Wonderful. I’ve saved it for future use. Thanks. DCD"

This needs to be turned into a short film. Now!

I was just looking around for more Penguicon pictures, and came across this one.

I am amused by the responses to it. ^-^ (And yes, we are from Silent Hill.)

- Amanda, the Zombie Nurse on the right.

Make this a South Park episode.

Best exchange:

GENERAL FRED: Are you sure?

SCIENTIST: As sure as we can be in the total absence of evidence.Brutal.

Tanasije Gjorgoski, I don't quite understand the argument. Science doesn't "a priori deduce facts." It generates and tests explanatory structures that purport to account for observed regularities. Physicalism (ontological naturalism) isn't an a priori theory of scientific methodology; it's an induction from the success of the scientific project. (Science generally proceeds within a physicalist framework because physicalism has worked well, whereas its competitors haven't. Operationally, this means that when scientists grapple with the phenomenon, the presumption is that whatever scientific explanation there is to be had resides within the physicalist framework.) The zombie argument, then, is an a priori argument that seeks to defeat this induction over the phenomenon of consciousness.

You don't seem to be addressing the strongest discussions of uncertainty regarding the subjective conscious experience,

Oh? And what are those, exactly? Be specific.

Our universe does not contain 'subjective' things, at least in the formal sense of the word. It contains only objective things, some of which are more or less accessible to limited human perception / technological detection.

The zombie idea isn't only wrong. It's also stupid. If you can't inhibit your innate sense that "minds are magic" long enough to recognize that your intuition is baseless and rather silly, you have utterly failed as an intellectual being.

Hopefully Anonymous, if you think a point should be addressed, make that point.

I say Eliezer has finally dealt with the zombie issue as it deserves.

It's a silly idea that invites convoluted discussion, which makes it look sophisticated and hard to refute.

I don't think that's correct. Scientists presuppose naturalism when they study a phenomenon.

What scientists DO presume is that the world can in some measure be described and understood.

I think Dennett would be flattered!

Caledonian: "___ isn't only wrong. It's also stupid."

"If you can't _, you have utterly failed as an intellectual being."

Brian Jaress: "I say Eliezer has finally dealt with the ___ issue as it deserves. It's a silly idea that invites convoluted discussion"

Dan: "However, I also agree that enough attention has been paid to _, except for me it's on the basis that they're badly-founded from the start."

These type posts are part of why I suspect this whole string of posts has its root in foil-seeking, more than enlightenment. More of a search for a soft target that can still put up a bit of dialectical frisson, perhaps for some utility in-group building and hierarchical construction.

But it seems to me to be a less interesting use of this site than other posts and series of posts, including from Eliezer.

As for what I think are "the strongest discussions of uncertainty regarding the subjective conscious experience", please see my blog, as they feature heavily in recent posts there, and I've already discussed them more than once here on OB.

Oh, and before I forget: the definition of epiphenomenalism

Please note that by this definition, declaring an epiphenomenon to be real has absolutely no implications for 'material reality' that declaring it to be unreal doesn't also have, and vice versa. In other words, it doesn't exist relative to material reality at all.

Trying to use it to explain the properties of material reality is therefore pointless.

This, of all the "directed to IQ greater than 125" entities of the world, is the funniest thing I have ever seen. The first time, I cried, fell, laughed, set myself straight, read more, woke up my father, and eventually offered hosting for life for Eliezer, in case he ever came to São Paulo. Now, reading it again, I have laughed, cried, contorted, and am wondering what to eat to celebrate.

This post was just linked to from the Freakonomics blog: http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/17/the-social-upheavalzombie-movie-index/

I stumbled upon this page, and am new to this site. I love the movie script, but it seems to me that qualiaphobes are making a difficult topic even more difficult than it needs to be. As I see it, 'qualia' is just a term that makes it easier for us to discuss the nature of our experiences. Experience is complex. At any given moment I am aware of many different colors, shapes, sounds, smells, etc. Complexity implies a multitude of elements that constitute a complex system. The constituent elements of a complex system (so far as we are able to identify them) need not necessarily be "fundamental" in any absolute ontological sense, but in any case we can better understand the nature of a complex system by being able to discuss compositional elements. As I said, experience is complex. It is convenient to have terms that help us to understand this complexity. Among the elements of my current experience, I find the color blue. We can talk about electromagnetic waves, chemistry in the retinal cells, neurotransmitters, etc., but it just seems awfully doggone handy to also be able to refer to the brute experiential nature of blue – that qualitative feeling of experiencing blue that serves as the basis for my ability to distinguish this color from some other color, or this visual sensation from other sensations like sounds or tastes. Yes, this does lead us into some profound philosophical and scientific puzzles, but I don't see this as a good reason to deny that these elements of my experience exist. The term 'qualia' is handy for referring to the elements of experience. Why muddy the waters by claiming that qualia don't exist? I might agree that qualia don't exist if we want to get into the Buddhist notion of emptiness (everything is interdependent and thus there are no ontologically isolated substances, that survive over time, etc.), but in that sense, nothing exists, so it’s a whole different ball game. But existence is a handy concept for purposes of science and everyday discussion, and if you want to assert that computers exist, then I see no reason to deny that the qualitative blue of my experience exists as well. The blue quale is simply "that element of my experience" that constitutes my felt capacity to distinguish this part of my computer screen (the blue part) from another part (e.g., the white part).

It is logically possible for me to response unconsciously to different elements of my environment. A subliminal image of a Coke can might cause me to take a sip of my drink. In this sense one might say I am acting "like a zombie" – following through on a specific behavior due to sensory inputs I'm not consciously aware of. (Blindsight is another example.) But what is it that I'm "not aware of"? I respond to the subliminal image without experiencing the image. 'Qualia' is a handy term we can use to refer to "that which is missing" in the subliminal image, but present in my experience if I become aware of the image. There is "nothing it is like" for me to be exposed to the subliminal image, as such, even though I am in some sense exposed to the sensory information, but there is something it is like for me to actually notice the image. The difference is the qualitative nature of my experience, verses the non-qualitative nature of subliminal stimuli. Trying to claim that the qualitative character of my experience "doesn't exist" or is "just an illusion" is unnecessarily confusing. I would also add that there is no logical reason that qualia have to be nonphysical, or intrinsically private. Qualia can be universals, and thus shared. Qualia could be a physical form of energy. None of this would prevent qualia from also being the compositional elements making up my complex "lived experience".

"Richard has credentials. I have competency."

Funny. Again, just out of curiosity, what is your basis for thinking yourself philosophically competent? A self-gratifying intuition, perhaps? (Credentialing by acknowledged experts, though an imperfect guide, is at least some protection against quackery.) I haven't even seen you make an argument, let alone a good one; all you do is make unsupported assertions and attempt to ridicule people who know more than you do. You appear to suffer delusions about your own abilities and the extent of your understanding. (As you say, "the inability... to perceive the wrongness with their arguments is generally insurmountable" -- what puzzles me is why this doesn't make you more humble about your own intuited greatness, given that nobody else is nearly so impressed.)

Now, you change the subject by shifting the burden to others, asking them to list the accomplishments of academic philosophy. (It's beyond dispute that our understanding of thousands of philosophical problems has advanced significantly in the past century -- just browse through any entry of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, or my own dozen favourite 'Examples of Solved Philosophy' -- though of course philosophical progress does not readily translate into technological progress the way that progress in other disciplines can.)

The question HA is raising (and that I can readily confirm) is that you do not seem to know what you are talking about. From what I can tell, you are completely ignorant of the field of philosophy and the work that goes on in it; so there is no reason for anyone to take seriously the unargued denunciations you offer from on high. You don't even know what it is that you're denouncing. You are to philosophy what young earth creationists are to biology.

Of course, if you offer a reasoned argument then others may consider it on its merits. (Even a stopped clock is right twice a day, and all that.) But you lack the authority to make mere assertions and expect anyone to take your ignorant pontificating seriously. That's all.

It's possible that you're right, but the evidence increasingly seems to be that you're pretending to knowledge and certainty about both academic philosophy and the physical sciences that's unjustified based on your level of competency or literacy in either field.

Ah, I see where you've become confused. What you're asking for is credentials, not competency. Richard has credentials. I have competency.

The question them becomes: how can one demonstrate competence in the absence of credentials, when your audience doesn't have the level of competence to which you're laying claim? It's easy when the argument whether, say, heavier-than-air flight is possible - you simply build the flying machine, and convincing the opposition of the wrongness of their argument is accomplished, even if they can't comprehend the flaw in their position. When you're dealing with highly abstract verbal arguments, though, the inability of the opposition to perceive the wrongness with their arguments is generally insurmountable. If they could perceive the problem, the conflict itself wouldn't be taking place.

What has academic philosophy accomplished, HA? I can answer that question for physics, mathematics, neurology, chemistry, psychology, engineering - for practically any established field you can name - without needing more than a few moments to think of examples. What can you offer for academic philosophy?

Take all the time you need.

Is there a genre of Daniel Dennett fan fiction yet, or is it still in its infancy?

Caledonian, perhaps if you had taken even a high school philosophy course, you would have learned that to dismiss the worth of philosophy is to engage in philosophy. I'm not sure whether your comments deserve to be ignored or mocked. They're that ridiculous.

Caledonian, It's possible that you're right, but the evidence increasingly seems to be that you're pretending to knowledge and certainty about both academic philosophy and the physical sciences that's unjustified based on your level of competency or literacy in either field. In that sense, your skepticism about the level of useful contributions to enlightenment by recent academic philosophy could, by your own standards, be reasonably turned towards your skepticism about those claimed contributions.

As for me, I'm woefully illiterate about the recent work of academic philosphy and (compared to the best contributors in the OB community) about the recent work of physical scientists. Also, my skill levels are such that I lack the core competencies to understand the recent work of physical scientists (which I suspect is math skills at the level of someone with a masters in applied math). That may apply to the recent work of academic philosophers too (not sure what those core competencies would be, separate from literacy of recent work done in that field). I hope to rectify this, particularly my current level of competency in applied math, but that's where I stand at the present time.

It might help our assessments of your posts, Caledonian, if you also share your level of competencies and literacy in these fields, transparently, with your fellow community members.

It doesn't just appear to be nonsense. It actually is nonsense.

And that is the crux of the problem right there. The intellectual standards of academic philosophy are incredibly low, and as usual the Law of the Minimum applies. It takes real effort to exceed Sturgeon's Law, but the field of philosophy has managed to do so.

Actual philosophical thought, as opposed to mere sophistry with a new hat, comes from people working in disciplines that have high standards for consistency, coherence, and permittable evidence. Their professional work has illuminated questions that 'philosophy' left in darkness for a thousand years - and because they possess skill at thinking, and have developed that skill through meeting those standards, their amateur philosophy is still infinitely better than the 'professionals'.

In this manner, philosophers have demonstrated the dangers of being self-righteous, of setting for yourself the standards that you strive to meet. They have done this by becoming an object lesson.

Perhaps the most embarrassing part about all of this--and there is much embarrassing in silly insults aimed at one's opposition being thrown around at a blog named "Overcoming Bias"--is that epiphenomenalists know the arguments, know quite well the apparent absurdity of the position, and have responses, and none of these seem to show up in all this discussion. For example, here. Alas, rather what we have here seems to be a gleeful variant of Ludditism: "Look at those fancy philosophers with their logic and their rationality and their big words! What a bunch of assholes!" Presuming one's opposition is stupid does not strike me as a reliable or respectable means of converging on the truth.

One gets the feeling that Overcoming Bias is to bias as O'Reilly's No Spin Zone is to spin.

Seeing something substantial addressed, as opposed to a secondhand reading, would be useful in that it would 1. move the discussion forward, and 2. show some evidence that the poster has actually taken the time to read the opposition and consider its best arguments.

Haha, this was great. I think you pulled the punch on one of your jokes, though. You should have added, "...at the middle of humanity as we know it."

the story continued...

The XXII World Congress of Philosophy 2008 inaugurated emergency gathering to solve this philosophical zombie problem.

Chalmers: We must find the neural correlates of consciousness.

Searle: No, lock them up in the Chinese room and see if they "understand" Chinese.

Kim: No, we must find the condition for these zombies to supervene consciousness again.

Putnam & Fodor: No, we should make consciousness to be not reducible to physics. Let's make these philosophical zombies multiply realizable!

Paul & Patricia Churchland: It's all over, everyone. Folk psychology is completely lost in them. They are all goners...

Turing: First thing is first. Make them write a Turing test and let's see if they are zombies or not.

McGinn: Fuck it. Chalmers is right. We cannot solve the Hard Problem of consciousness.

Or maybe it's because that is what the word 'zombie' is used to refer to in philosophy, and trying to redefine the term arbitrarily is pointless.

If you have a different concept you'd like to discuss, use a different term - or provide some good reasons for why you must adopt an already-existing term with an already-existing accepted meaning.

"There exist sophisticated arguments for philosophical zombies, but I won't tell you them!"

However, I also agree that enough attention has been paid to zombies, except for me it's on the basis that they're badly-founded from the start. However, a movie about an epiphenomenal virus is, in fact, far too funny not to enjoy. My only complaint is that the philosophers use real words, when we all know that real philosophers speak badly-mangled Latin mixed with made-up words.

Eliezer, is this enlightenment or foil-seeking? You don't seem to be addressing the strongest discussions of uncertainty regarding the subjective conscious experience, which is where the action should be in a blog community this relatively ingtelligent. It seems to me you're looking for easy foils to slay, sort of like Dawkins, Hitchens, and Randi (and before them, Gould). I think that's sucking up discussion oxygen here, and'll end up driving away the more intelligent posters to other online venues. Worst case scenario, it'll help dampen interesting discussion by smart people, like was done for years regarding the distribution and heritability of intelligence (in this case regarding the subjective conscious experience and discernment technology).

Eliezer, are you by any chance a fan of the Silent Hill videogame franchise? Those zombie nurses strongly remind me of those games.

Personally I enjoyed the movie :) Just because I am consciousness ))

Would David Chambers have written "A P-zombie in Carcosa"?

The front cover of Chalmers' new self-help book... http://www.lulztruck.com/42025/mommy-why-did-you-shoot-daddy-in-the-head-2/

Cylons

I think there is an equivocation being made between the various usages of 'philosophy', primarily between a type of thought and a profession, and my observation is that those who are professionals supposedly dedicated to that type of thought rarely even try to engage in it, and when they do they're not very good at it. If 'philosophy' is 'what philosophers do', I hold that philosophy is useless in every sense. If 'philosophers' are 'those that practice philosophy', the professionals are almost universally undeserving of that title. In that light:

Yes to #1, YES to #2, no to #3, yes to #4.

OK Caledonian, I think it would help to make explicit your position (others too but first yours) tell me how much I have right....

1) you think that there can be philosophical progress (i.e. not the strong position being argued against above)

2) you think that progress tends not to happen in the field of philosophy (I presume because of how philosophy forms free floating ideas rather than ones 'grounded' by their attachment to empirical evidence)

• the practical implication being that philosophy should no expect answers to some questions before groundwork is done in other areas.

3) you evaluate 'progress' and 'useful' in a different way to Richard and HA, Richard would find a interesting logical debate 'useful' you would ask if the logic can be used to make a car or feed the hungry or whatever. to get slightly more philosophical - maybe it is 'empirically verifiable truth'?

4) To try to use data created by a feild you dont trust to create good data to prove that the feild doesn't create good data seems unlikely to be unproductive (shutting the door to the 'why don't you argue from the literature').

From what I can tell, you are completely ignorant of the field of philosophy and the work that goes on in it;

But you lack the authority to make mere assertions

@ mtraven; can you expand an the similarities between this blog post and BSG? That would be very interesting.