Interesting (I hope) tangent:

I'm autistic, which means among other things that my native modes of signaling are 'nonstandard'. I don't easily understand what most other people are trying to signal, and most other people don't easily understand what I'm signaling. (This appears to be due to both different modes of signaling and different goals.) Unlike some auties, I do emit signals in the 'normal' mode - they're just usually not very accurate signals of what I actually think or value.

I don't like being misunderstood, so I made a conscientious effort for a long time to cut my 'normal-style' signaling behaviors down to near-zero, if they were happening incidentally to something else - wearing the most neutral clothing I could find, for example, and not discussing my own preferences about anything without a clear reason to do so. Most of the specific tricks I picked up, I integrated as habits, so that the whole process didn't take a disruptive amount of mental effort, with the side effect that it's hard for me to pick out specific examples, but I did eventually get quite good at not signaling much at all. (If anyone's interested in specific examples, I'm willing to take the time to pull some out of long-term memory, but that may take me as much as a couple of days.)

The response to that was interesting. Most people appear to be very uncomfortable dealing with someone who doesn't signal, and the pressure to do so was significant. It also appears that refusal to signal is taken as a signal of either untrustworthiness, extreme shyness, or disdain, depending on the heuristics being used by the person observing it.

So my experience is basically that we as a society are in a nasty feedback loop when it comes to signaling - it's simply not a viable option not to signal, in most situations. People will read extra information into your actions whether you want them to or not, and if you don't choose actions that signal good things, your actions will be taken as a signal of bad things.

(I'm a stubborn cuss who cares more about her own ideology than she does about her social standing, so I continued not signaling anyway. The way I see it, other peoples' assumptions are not really my problem, but if I were to promote incorrect information, even nonverbally, that'd be wrong of me. Fortunately I've recently been able to move to a situation where I can signal accurately to the people I interact with, and do so regularly, and it works much better.)

Maybe to find something we need to dissect "we" into smaller parts. On average masturbation is not signaling; for some small subset of people it is. On average we don't advertise how much time we spend on entertainment; for some subset of the population it's a matter of intense group politics.

Thanks to the internet, I can think of all kinds of bizarre subgroups whose behavior wouldn't have been associated with signaling in the past, until they found others like themselves, at which point ordinary status instincts took over.

Voted up, but as Adaptation-Executers (rather than Fitness-Maximizers) we can't trust whether an activity is about signalling just by whether or not it has any signalling value in our present environment.

What would a hunter-gatherer do that has no signalling value for their inclusive genetic fitness? What activities we do that come from adaptations of those hunter-gatherer activities?

You're unlikely to find things this way, because you're thinking of named activities that you noticed happening. Both of those limitations select for things that are socially relevant - the 'named things' one especially, because the things that there are names for are things that are socially interesting, that people would want to talk about, and that's going to be almost entirely social-signaling things.

It seems like you'd do better to think about actions that don't have specific, short names, and that people don't usually pay attention to, either in themselves or in others. For example, where in a (communal) closet one hangs one's coat, or what direction one faces when in the shower.

"Least signaling" is a bit too vague to work with. Under your definition, the only criteria seems to be the degree to which we can talk about it. Anything at all that is socially acceptable to talk about can be construed as a signaling activity, so this definition is not very useful compared to say, basing it off of how many people would do it being observed vs. not observed, or which country they would choose to live in in the data you cited.

If it's pleasant, I can brag about it to show how much leisure time I have / how my life is better than yours. If it's unpleasant but useful, I can use it to show how good of a work ethic I have that I got it done. If it's expensive, it shows I'm richer than you. If it's cheap, it shows I'm thriftier than you. If it's beautiful, it shows I have better taste than you. If it's ugly, it shows that I'm enlightened enough to know that it's not really ugly, or I'm thrifty, or I'm above aesthetics. If it's a complete waste of time, well, it lends itself to a good story and lets me showcase my sense of humor. If it's really, really unpleasant and pointless (like a serious disease/injury), I can gain your sympathy, improve my image (who speaks ill of the dying?) and make people remember me better than they otherwise would. If it's taboo, I probably don't talk about it, but if I could, oh, you bet it'd be a signal of some kind.

This seems to be right on the brink of the Perfectly General Explanation, if our only criteria is "Can we find a way to signal status/fitness with it?." The fact that damn near everything we do can be used to signal does not mean that it is actually done for the purpose of signaling, or indeed that signaling affects it in any way.

Moreover, 11% of people are willing to have their car get broken into as long as the people around them get their cars broken into more. Same thing with being sick. Thus, the argument that someone, somewhere, could construe getting AIDS as being mostly positional (e.g. he gets AIDS for signaling purposes) does not mean that getting AIDS can be seen as being even partly positional in the vast majority of cases.

You need some kind of definition for "signaling activity" such that it doesn't contain every direction and magnitude of pretty much everything we can possibly do. Using the percentages in the data you posted might work. Examining how much behaviour changes in the absence/presence of observation would also work, though it's harder. But the current discussion does not seem productive; all it does is show that under certain circumstances, if we can't talk about certain things, we won't signal with them.

Signalling can be read into any activity communicated to anyone else. That leaves only things done on one's own that one does not customarily talk about.

Meditation.

Excretion.

Why are you interested in locating the least signalling activities?

If the ancient (proto-human) mental construction of 'self' was a remodeled and turned inside-out version of the 'other people' mental construction, the distinction between signaling to nobody and signaling to yourself may not be on as sturdy grounds as it seems.

The idea seems to make sense: Evolution doesn't jump in huge strides, so the progress from not-having-a-self to having-a-self must have been a cumulative one. The only place for similar parts to be worked on an advanced is within social behavior with your group, so that at least seems reasonable at the surface. Dennett suggests the role understanding our peers played in eventually training us in how to understand ourselves in 'Consciousness Explained', 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea', Dawkins mentions things like this in 'The Ancestor's Tale', and in Clegg's book 'Upgrade Me', he cites a similar human origin story.

So even when you are alone, you are still communicating and possibly signaling to an audience of one, perhaps. You are signaling to the entity you understand to be yourself the behaviors and actions you believe to be socially (personally) acceptable for you to perform within the confines of the private, one person audience.

It may sound strange but with the evolutionary underpinnings the 'self' may not be so wholly divorced a concept from the 'other people' as we thought. Since these behaviors only seem to indicate a change in expectations rather than a release of all social restrictions and responsibilities, I am not sure that these activities really signal a clearer and more rational state of thinking -- just a different audience, different game. Just being alone doesn't necessarily strip off the animal reasoning.

Perhaps less resources are devoted to the social game and that would be a legitimate reason to trust someone's reasoning more, but then there are benefits to social reasoning too.

Not signalling is

plausibly a more honest mental mode

Why should it be more "honest" not to signal? We are a social species. I conceive it possible to make a close relationship closer by signalling to ones partner what is actually the case.

Things like exercise, studying, which increase fitness and status may be motivated by the desire to increase fitness and status, with signalling only a by-product of this.

In moments of threat where the amygdala takes over, and time seems to slow down, a person responds to the threat, probably without signalling. But it is meaningless to say that I am "honest" when in a fight or flight situation, and at no other time.

I take it that the point of this thread is to find activities which exemplify a low-signalling "mental mode".

Most of the commentators have pointed to activities, as topics, which feature more or less often in our signalling conversations. My attempt to point to the manner in which we do activities, in which signals least pollute our thinking, was voted into oblivion.

Again, however, I would like to suggest that activities characterized by ecstasy and intense engagement are good examples of what RH called "a more honest mental mode".

When I talk about music or logic, for example, I fall inevitably into signalling. My thinking becomes less "honest" as it becomes less responsible to its topic and more responsible to the social perception it elicits.

But when I am intensely engaged in making music or logical proofs, my thinking sometimes, when I am working well, becomes almost entirely responsible to that activity. My "mental mode" is more "honest" as I become more responsible to the rhythms the activity itself elicits and less responsible to elicit social perception through that activity.

My guess is that how often an activity features in our signal-rich conversations is likely to be an inconsistent indicator of the extent to which our mental mode while engaged in that activity is made "dishonest" by the work of signalling. Some activities, like sex, often feature in our signalling conversations; but, when we do the activity well, I suggest, we are not typically signalling.

I suspect that we are more likely to find better examples of "honest mental modes" by looking at the manner in which an activity is done, and not the degree of social interest in the activity. In particular, I suspect that activities which demand or admit a high degree of ecstasy or engagement, -- activities, that is, in which submitting to the rhythms of the activity requires nearly full attention and so starves out whatever attention would otherwise be devoted to signalling, -- will be among the best examples of "honest mental modes".

Considered as heuristics, or even adaptations, specific signaling behaviors don't necessarily distinguish the situations where the behaviors can be observed by others and those where they can't be. Behaviors that take contextual efficacy into account are more complicated, and likely won't be developed unless the cost of idle signaling is high. The choice to contextually choose to implement a behavior should be considered a part of that behavior.

Thus, privacy of behavior isn't a very good criterion: given behavior may be just a context-insensitive side effect of some other signaling behavior, and as such won't be the best thing to do in that situation, still optimized for signaling.

Instead, it might be better to look for behaviors (globally, including the choice to perform in context as part) that have low signaling payoff and high personal cost of getting wrong. For behaviors that are never observed by others, the heuristics is that signaling payoff is (almost) zero, but the problem with this heuristics, as was pointed out is other comments, is that almost any behavior can be observed one way or the other by other people, even through the effect of self-signaling.

I see one possible goal of looking for behaviors untainted by signaling: they allow to elicit personal preference more clearly. Thus, it's instructive to start from preferences, and look for decisions that go strongly for or against these preferences (thus having high personal cost of getting wrong), without significantly influencing the person's image, with both factors only weakly depending on context.

This generates the following examples. Important food choices, if your social circle doesn't care about food. A not-extraordinarily-looking hobby, if you are not involved in a community of same-theme hobbyists. Topics for which you surf the web. Choice of books to read, among image-similar classes. Job choice, if it isn't impressive for other communities you are member of. More generally, a choice of community to participate in (among image-similar options).

This shows another pattern: even if a choice is important for signaling, there usually exist subsets of options for this choice, for which it's unimportant for your image which particular elements get chosen. Then, the choice among these options in a subset may be clear of signaling, even if the global decision isn't.

You might suggest sleep, but others are often jealous of how much sleep we get, or impressed by how little sleep we can get by on.

In that case, parallel reasoning eliminates anything taboo. We signal our acceptance of community norms by avoiding taboo subjects. We might tell stories to make it less obvious that conformity is an end in itself: "intelligent people resist the temptation to swear and find more effective ways to express themselves," cf. George Carlin and his seven words.

Fight of flight responses seem like a pretty clear case. Until the 20th century, most military engagements were won by putting the enemy's troops to rout and then destroying the fleeing army in detail. That suggests many find it preferable to risk total disgrace, and possible death later, to be able to run away from an immediately dangerous situation. (cf. The Red Badge of Courage, Spartan women saying "come back with your shield or on it.") Other extremely intense situations, like a parent protecting the life of a child, would probably work the same way.

We're told it's a bad idea to go into business with friends because we tend to overestimate the likelihood that they will remain loyal to us. Also, we're sometimes willing to put up with the opprobrium of friends or relatives for a potential mate. Obviously signaling is extremely important in business and mating, but we will ignore it if the price is right.

Actions taken under the influence of drugs or alcohol might count, although there's a wide range of behaviors to sort through. In college I knew a lot of people who drank heavily and publicly so that they could be (or feel, or feel perceived to be) signal-free for a while. There's also the narrative that East Asian societies are socially repressive but don't hold individuals responsible for their behavior while drunk, so binge drinking in groups is a common way to relieve stress. I have no idea whether it's true, but it's obviously a story about signaling. On the other hand, a guy on an acid trip, having a conversation with inanimate objects, isn't signaling anybody.

Anything habitually done alone and considered pointless, embarrassing, unwise, or revolting to discuss publicly is a candidate. Most things that go on in the bathroom count. Clipping one's toenails (if one does not wear open-toed shoes); little doodles, drawn with no one watching, to be thrown away after completion; doing laundry in a private washing machine; selecting a toaster setting when preparing breakfast alone.

It's possible that I'm underestimating the sorts of things people subconsciously expect others to pick up on, but I also doubt anyone is signaling when: they (publicly) eat (their own) package of M&Ms with a particular color order in mind; they change lightbulbs; they skip one short story in an anthology; they pick at lint on an article of clothing. Choosing to do these things or not isn't obtrusive, and when they are done at all, there isn't much meaningful variation in how they're done. (Which short story you skip might matter, but out of an entire anthology, it's unlikely that one worth skipping would come up in conversation individually, and I don't think the story-skipping party would be likely to bring it up first.)

Signaling is, generally speaking, a means of displaying social status and desirability as a mate, yes?

Ergo, anything that directly fulfills a basic physical imperative other than the reproductive drive is a likely candidate for non-signaling. Hunger, exhaustion, the fight or flight reaction, &c. Of course, all of these can be wrapped in contexts indicating social status, but the actions themselves are likely mostly neutral. e.g., people may brag about their sleep habits for status, but when they do go to bed it's probably because they're tired, not because they're thinking about how it will impress others. It's the talking about sleeping that is doing the signaling here.

As others have mentioned, there seems like there's an important distinction between doing things, talking about doing things, and doing things so we can talk about having done them. Whether or not they actually signal anything is a different issue. There are many things I think we do or do not do with no signaling intent. We sincerely might not care what our shoes say about us, and so our choice of shoes has very little signaling motivation, but we may nevertheless signal very strongly to certain people through our choice of shoes.

And many things that we do not intending to signal, we can use to signal by talking about them later. Like everybody, I need to eat. I used to go to lunch at the same place every day and get "the special," since it was always one of three sandwiches I liked, and that way I didn't have to think about it. At some point, it occurred to me that telling someone that I ordered "the special" every day might communicate something like my highly-focused intellectual's dislike of trivial distraction, so I started to tell people that I ordered the special for lunch every day. But that's not why I started doing it. I now eat a ham sub sandwich almost every day for lunch, and I don't believe I have told this to anyone before now. No doubt I signal something when I say that I do this almost exclusively because I like ham subs from this particular shop a lot and it doesn't cost very much, but I don't eat there all the time so I can say this.

Like others, I like to impress people with how impressively well-read I am. For all I know, all my intellectual interests are rooted in some kind of biological signaling imperative. But given those interests, I read lots of things just because I'm curious about them. There's lots of stuff that I've read in private and never thought about again. Same with TV. In fact, these are probably my main non-signaling activities, time-wise. That said, I read even more stuff because I want to draw on it in conversations and debates, etc. We might choose to undertake certain KINDS of conventionally strongly signaling activities in order to signal, but we might also perform the activity in specific instances with no signaling interest.

Also, cuddling and playing with my dog. I do it a lot when nobody's around because I really like it. Maybe I'm signaling to my dog that I love him? Maybe certain kinds of signaling are enjoyable for their own sake, and so we send the signals to our dogs or into an empty house, indifferent to its success, just because we need to send signals like we need to eat?

What about on the receiving end? Who is less conscious: The signaler, or the receiver?

I brought this topic up in the meditation/discussion group that I'm a member of, and we discussed it for a couple of hours. The log is here.

Dissect the signal: I am a non-androgynous heterosexual male, age 31, living in Canada. I carry a purse in which I keep my wallet and various useful items, in spite of the fact that men in my culture almost never do. To my conscious mind, I do so almost entirely because it's a ridonculously useful thing to do. What am I unconsciously signalling thereby, and to whom? (There is a non-null answer to this question, but it took me a few minutes today to sort it out.)

Here's another possibility: addictive behaviors. Addiction is, generally speaking, a compulsion to partake of some behavior with disregard for costs associated with the behavior. This can be extended to include a disregard for potential signals sent by the behavior, in much the same way that someone who is sufficiently hungry will desire to eat with no regard for signaling.

Given what AdeleneDawner reports about experiences with non-signaling, I wonder if part of the reason for the (sometimes apparently disproportionate) social stigma of addiction stems from the blatant disregard for signaling displayed by addicts?

For instance, it seems to me that someone who makes consistently bad decisions with an awareness of signaling is less likely to suffer additional social penalties than someone who makes similarly bad decisions as part of satisfying an addiction.

The more signaling matters, the less I can trust such reasoning, as it usually does not acknowledge the signaling influences.

I like this motivation, but I think you're going down a dead end looking for non-signaling-but-reasoned-and-interesting choices. I don't think there's such a thing, as signaling is part of our motivational makeup, and factors into even things that other people cannot know.

I expect much more success attacking the second half of the sentence. Knowing that signaling is a core component of preferences, train your decision apparatus to acknowledge it, and take it into account. Note that this applies not to just signaling, but for all motivations that some parts of you wish you didn't have, or didn't weigh so heavily.

Are you looking for things that cannot be used for signaling, or things that have primary motivations other than signaling, or something else? A theory of partial motivations seems doomed, unless you've first solved the problem of scalar (as opposed to ordinal) choices.

I don't think there's ANYTHING which qualifies as action and has no signaling component. Any biological function carries a bit of data about health, and any mental function says something about motivation or ability.

Even things normally done in private (shitting, inner dialog) are signals. The fact that we keep them private is an indication of following social norms.

If we're just trying to ignore signaling as a motivation, and look for activities which we're motivated to do in addition to their signaling value, I'd propose looking at things with immediate survival value, and things that don't involve cognitive choice. "Removing your hand from a hot stove" is something I don't think is primarily done for signaling.

You might suggest watching TV, but people often go out of their way to mention what TV shows they watch.

There's an interesting trend in TV-related signaling here in Russia: watching TV -- or even merely having it at home -- is considered mauvais ton (sorry, don't know how to express this in English) among smarter and progressive young people.

(Which is not surprising at all given the horrendous state of the Russian TV nowadays.)

If there is a distinctive mental mode we enter when reasoning about how exactly to defecate, nose-pick, sleep, masturbate, and so on, this is plausibly a more honest mental mode.

This is worth doing empirical studies on. Do people think more rationally, especially on socially-charged issues, when they're on the toilet and thoughts of their image/dignity recede to the background?