See: You Be the Jury, The Amanda Knox Test
While we hear about Bayes' Theorem being under threat in some courts, it is nice to savor the occasional moment of rationality prevailing in the justice system, and of mistakes being corrected.
Congratulations to the Italian court system for successfully saying "Oops!"
Things go wrong in this world quite a bit, as we know. Sometimes it's appropriate to just say "hooray!" when they go right.
Discuss, or celebrate.
Several news sites (including the Daily Mail Online, the Sun, Sky News and the Guardian, and that's just the UK ones) heard the judge say "guilty" about slander, & posted the wrong verdict about the murder conviction.
It's not unusual to have more than one story ready to go, but the Daily Mail online was particularly detailed:
As Knox realized the enormity of what judge Hellman was saying she sank into her chair sobbing uncontrollably while her family and friends hugged each other in tears.
A few feet away Meredith's mother Arline, her sister Stephanie and brother Lyle, who had flown in especially for the verdict remained expressionless, staring straight ahead, glancing over just once at the distraught Knox family.
Prosecutors were delighted with the verdict and said that 'justice has been done' although they said on a 'human factor it was sad two young people would be spending years in jail'
Maybe they tapped phones in another Everett branch?
It is good news.
According to the BBC report there were loud crowds outside protesting that she was freed. Why they trust the first court case, but not a second case with equal/better access to evidence is worrying but worth thinking about.
Could one categorise it as anchoring to the original response?
Why they trust the first court case, but not a second case with equal/better access to evidence is worrying but worth thinking about.
The simple answer is that it's hard to change your mind, since once a belief gets formed it tends to become entrenched in various ways. There's a sequence and an upcoming book about the specific ways in which that's true, but some which seem most relevant in this case are:
Confirmation bias. Once someone forms a belief, all the new evidence that they see gets interpreted in light of that belief so that consistent evidence seems solid & important and inconsistent evidence seems dubious. Even if someone's initial belief was based on the first verdict, by the time the contrary second verdict comes in they feel like there is all of this other evidence alongside the first verdict.
Thinking in narratives. Once someone forms a belief they come up with a story for why others disagree with them (e.g., they're just biased in favor of the sympathetic pretty American woman), and as long as new events can be fit into their storyline they aren't much of a challenge to the existing views embodied in that narrative.
Identity. Once someone identifies with one side of an issue, they'll associate that side with all sorts of wonderful values & virtues (e.g., standing up for the integrity of the Italian justice system against the meddling foreigners) and they'll see changing their mind as abandoning their side and failing to live up to its values & virtues.
One of the most interesting and tragic things about this is how Kercher's family has reacted very negatively. See e.g. this article.
This is an understandable reaction on their part. They've become convinced that Knox killed their daughter and tried to cover it up. The amount of emotion and feelings of identity that must get wrapped up in trying to make sure that the killer of one's child is convicted and jailed must be massive. The cognitive difficulty in acknowledging that one has gone after the wrong person must be immense. If I were (Omega forbid) in a similar situation, I suspect that I'd react very similarly to the Kercher family.
One of the most interesting and tragic things about this is how Kercher's family has reacted very negatively. See e.g. this article.
Which is, I must say, disgraceful behavior. The only redeeming feature is that they are powerless to do anything about it.
Wanting to destroy the lives of people they have no evidence have done anything to harm anyone and using what social influence they have to make others also wish to destroy said lives resolves as (impotent) evil. That their daughter has died is very little excuse.
I'm curious. Have you ever lost a loved one due to someone else's actions? The closest experience I have to this is a cousin who was killed about a year ago by a speeding driver. My cousin Brandon wasn't that old. He hadn't been a great student in highschool but had really shaped up and become a lot more responsible in college. Brandon was working to become a chef, something he was clearly good at and clearly enjoyed. My cousin was on his bike and never even saw the car. He had on a helmet. It saved his life, for a few days. His grandmother, my aunt, was on an airplane flight when the accident happened. She was on her way to the funeral of another relative who had killed himself. She found out about the accident as her plane taxied to the gate.
At first, after a few days in the hospital it seemed that Brandon was going to make it. Then he took a sudden turn for the worst and his organs started to fail. The end was so sudden that some of my relatives saw in their inboxes the email update saying that Brandon wasn't like to make it right under the email saying he had died.
Then, it turned out that the driver of the car had a history of speeding problems. He received in a year in jail for vehicular homicide. A small compensation for the entire life Brandon had in front of him.
If someone came up to me, and gave me the choice of making that driver die a slow painful, agonizing death I'd probably say yes. It would be wrong. Deeply wrong. But the emotion is that strong; I don't know if I could override it.
But I can still understand that that's wrong. The driver was an aging Vietnam vet with a history of medical problems. He had little family. He was so distraught over what happened that when initially put in jail before the trial, there was worry that he might kill himself. He seems to be an old, lonely, broken man. Harming him accomplishes little. And yet, despite all that, the desire to see him suffer still burns deeply within me.
How much more would I feel if I thought that someone had killed a relative, or even my own child? And if the court had repeatedly agreed and told me that that was the guilty person. How could I ever emotionally acknowledge that I had been after the wrong person, that not only had I persecuted the wrong person, but the person who had done this terrible deed was still out there, and free? I'd like to believe that I'm a rational person so that I could make that acknowledgment. But the fact that even when it is just a cousin I still deeply desire someone to suffer in ways that help no one at all... I doubt I could do it.
To call the Kerchers evil or their desires evil is a deep failure of empathy.
If someone came up to me, and gave me the choice of making that driver die a slow painful, agonizing death I'd probably say yes. It would be wrong. Deeply wrong. But the emotion is that strong I don't know if I could override it.
You're talking about killing that driver. The actual villain in the story. I don't have any particular problem with vengeance, I often advocate it. But that's an entirely different to killing Mortimer Q. Snodgrass, who lives at 128 Ordinary Ln. just because... well... you really want to kill somebody. This isn't even a case of finding a different driver who also happens to be reckless and likely to kill people like your friend. This is choosing to kill someone with a AAA driving rating who you have no reason at all to suspect is dangerous.
To call the Kerchers evil is a deep failure of empathy.
Even leaving aside the difference between saying that a behavior resolves as evil and calling a person evil I suggest it is you who is failing at empathy here (partially as a result of the aforementioned simple comprehension error). I am empathizing here with all the victims of blatantly irrational persecution. The lives destroyed because people use their social influence to make their community destroy others because of their own willful stupidity.
If I hear a story of a father going out and killing his daughter's murderer I would shrug, have no particular moral judgement and definitely not call the act evil but still advocate a minor prison sentence purely for pragmatic reasons. But when if that same parent started publicly declaring that somebody should be punished when no evidence supports that theory and he is being entirely stupid then I would call the act evil. Because while the damage done to innocents is amortized (sometimes it outright causes them to be killed, sometimes it does nothing) it is still a massively toxic and dangerous thing on average caused by features of my species that I detest.
I think I can resolve this. JoshuaZ would almost definitely admit that they were being irrational. What he disagrees with is you going further and calling it disgraceful and evil.
So what's the difference? He seems to have pinpointed the former term as implying that they're trying to do harm, and the latter one as adding a whole slew of extra layers of incompetence or idiocy. He argued that they aren't targeting somebody they think is innocent (thus they're not "evil"), and that their failure of irrationality was understandable (therefore not "disgraceful"). That's it.
He disagreed with you by arguing that their behavior isn't intentionally bad (as "evil" seems to imply), and that it's much more excusable than what "disgraceful" seems to connote. But you on the other hand seem to be using these terms not to make them sound like they want to harm an innocent person or are stupider than they are, but simply to stress just how destructive this sort of behavior is and can be.
As often is the case, the disagreement seems to boil down to simple miscommunication. If I'm right in my (somewhat cursory) assessment, then there's no actual difference of opinion, and this is just yet another mundane example of the words getting in the way.
As often is the case, the disagreement seems to boil down to simple miscommunication. If I'm right in my (somewhat cursory) assessment, then there's no actual difference of opinion, and this is just yet another mundane example of the words getting in the way.
There is a difference in actual opinion. It is not excessively important right now given how little power we have over this scenario. It would become important if we were, for example, choosing where the law should place the boundary of 'libel' and related laws.
He argued that they aren't targeting somebody they think is innocent (thus they're not "evil"), and that their failure of irrationality was understandable (therefore not "disgraceful"). That's it.
That's a big 'it'. I understand why humans do an awful lot of the things they do and quite often empathize with them. It's understandable for people to want other people's stuff, have sex and to eliminate rivals, for example. That doesn't make the behaviours involved less disgraceful or necessary to prevent.
So what's the difference? He seems to have pinpointed the former term as implying that they're trying to do harm, and the latter one as adding a whole slew of extra layers of incompetence or idiocy.
They are trying to do harm. They are trying to destroy the lives of some scapegoats.
There is a difference in actual opinion. It is not excessively important right now given how little power we have over this scenario. It would become important if we were, for example, choosing where the law should place the boundary of 'libel' and related laws.
I don't understand how the second two sentences support the first.
That's a big 'it'. I understand why humans do an awful lot of the things they do and quite often empathize with them. It's understandable for people to want other people's stuff, have sex and to eliminate rivals, for example. That doesn't make the behaviours involved less disgraceful or necessary to prevent.
What's "disgraceful" mean to you? To JoshuaZ it meant unusually idiotic and irrational. He argued that this isn't the case; it's very usual ("understandable").
I assume you mean something else by "disgraceful" (very destructive and necessary to prevent or whatever), thus as often is the case the disagreement boils down to miscommunication by both parties.
They are trying to do harm. They are trying to destroy the lives of some scapegoats.
No, they're trying to destroy the lives of who they think murdered their daughter. That's certainly not a case of trying to harm who they think an innocent person (which is the ordinary interpretation of "evil" and how JoshuaZ seems to have interpreted it).
Notice how the perspective changes in your sentence:
They are trying to destroy the lives
This is from their perspective. It's a statement about their state of mind: they want to destroy these people's lives.
some scapegoats
But now it's from your point of view. It's a statement about your state of mind: they're innocent people being targeted for emotional reasons (or more precisely, people with no or not enough evidence against them to be criminalized).
A statement that stays on their perspective (as opposed to quietly switching to yours at the end) would read like this: "They are trying to destroy the lives of the people who they think brutally murdered their daughter." And with that it loses the "evil" flavor and picks up one much more mundane (though perhaps equally as destructive): "irrational".
Or at least that's how I use the word "evil". You're free to use it differently such that it would apply, but then your disagreement with me and JoshuaZ would evaporate into a fog of semantics (as many or most do).
You're talking about killing that driver. The actual villain in the story. I don't have any particular problem with vengeance, I often advocate it. But that's an entirely different to killing Mortimer Q. Snodgrass, who lives at 128 Ordinary Ln. just because... well... you really want to kill somebody. This isn't even a case of finding a different driver who also happens to be reckless and likely to kill people like your friend. This is choosing to kill someone with a AAA driving rating who you have no reason at all to suspect is dangerous.
Not to the Kerchers. It doesn't seem that way to them at all. As far as they are concerned, Amanda Knox killed Meredith. And they have evidence and multiple court rulings that agree with them.
Even leaving aside the difference between saying that a behavior resolves as evil and calling a person evil I suggest it is you who is failing at empathy here (partially as a result of the aforementioned simple comprehension error).
There's a slight issue here in that I changed my wording slightly after I posted the comment so that I referred to the Kerchers and their desires. I think that this is a fair response since the subject of your verb is "wanting". I don't think you are appreciating the epistemological issue here. They believe, quite sincerely that Amanda Knox is guilty. They are almost certainly wrong in that belief. But they don't have a desire to harm a random person.
I am empathizing here with all the victims of blatantly irrational persecution. The lives destroyed because people use their social influence to make their community destroy others because of their own willful stupidity.
How much of that stupidity is willful and how much is just deep cognitive issues that would ensnare almost any human? This isn't akin to Joseph Priestly trying desperately to think of any hypothesis he could to defend phlogiston becuase that's his preferred hypothesis.
There may be a communication issue here in that your sentence starting "wanting" seemed to be the main jumping off point of my comment. I interpreted that as referring to the desire not any relevant act, since well, wanting is an emotional state.
Not to the Kerchers. It doesn't seem that way to them at all. As far as they are concerned, Amanda Knox killed Meredith.
I don't place as much moral weight as I once did on what people believe. This is heavily influenced by an improved model of what relationships beliefs have with behavior and instinct. In humans. There really was a time when I considered self deception a worthwhile excuse for subsequent bad behavior rather than just what it often takes for us to get away with what we are motivated to do anyway.
If we are going to have any success at things like raising the sanity waterline, we need to understand how and when human reasoning fails. And we need to appreciate how much that depends on circumstances. In the same way that almost any of us if we were born in the US in 1810 would have been in favor of slavery, and almost any of us born in 1930 would have been against interracial marriage, it is important to understand that we don't have some magic gift of rationality. If one of us were in the same situation as the Kerchers, we'd likely react the same way, and I'd go so far as to say that even someone as highly rational as most LWians with all the experience and awareness of cognitive biases would still likely react the same way.
To destroy bias we must understand it.
There really was a time when I considered self deception a worthwhile excuse for subsequent bad behavior rather than just what it often takes for us to get away with what we are motivated to do anyway.
I don't see a motivation that the Kerchers would be motivated to harm Amanda Knox other than their belief that she killed their daughter. In this context, what do you think is the underlying motive that they are engaging in self-deception to accomplish?
I don't see a motivation that the Kerchers would be motivated to harm Amanda Knox other than their belief that she killed their daughter. In this context, what do you think is the underlying motive that they are engaging in self-deception to accomplish?
They -- and their lawyer -- have a pecuniary incentive to seek a verdict against Knox and Sollecito, since it would entail the imposition of monetary damages in the millions of euros. Needless to say, Rudy Guédé's financial rescources are almost certainly not comparable to those of Knox and Sollecito (even though the latter two aren't themselves extraordinarily wealthy).
Of course, this probably doesn't directly pass into their conscious motivation; but it still likely affects their judgement.
If someone came up to me, and gave me the choice of making that driver die a slow painful, agonizing death I'd probably say yes. It would be wrong. Deeply wrong. But the emotion is that strong; I don't know if I could override it.
Even if a man's life is at stake? Come on, it's not a place to express modesty before the drives of nature.
To me, the part of this comment that smacks of empathy failure is where you say "That their daughter has died is very little excuse."
My original version (which I truncated because the comment was getting too large) was perhaps more clear. It explained that it is an excuse in a similar way to "he was abused as a child" is an excuse to abuse children when an adult. It kind of explains it a little and perhaps warrants a lesser punishment but it doesn't directly justify it. This is distinct from the more direct kind of excuse like "self defense", "they had been abusing me consistently" or "they killed my daughter and I was getting revenge" where the actual behaviour is closer to being the right thing to do in the circumstances.
The above was condensed into 'very little' because I sometimes manage to refrain from exploring all tangents.
I never followed the Knox case, but I now looked at some of the old lesswrong posts regarding it -- and at least one of the sites linked to (http://truejustice.org/ee/index.php), is currently down. As is the case with all broken links, this is bad for our collective memory of the arguments made and discussed back then.
In regards to this issue in particular, where we had "Knox test" by which people should look at the sides in question as argued by external sites, this is quite negative, if the sites go down and we haven't saved their arguments in question. (I encourage anyone who has cached versions of those sites to also save them in more permanent form)
I'll try to save as much as I can from sources like the wayback machine, but perhaps we here in LessWrong should collectively start considering ways in which we can make our old discussions less dependent on ephemeral external links. Too many links break.
I never followed the Knox case, but I now looked at some of the old lesswrong posts regarding it -- and at least one of the sites linked to (http://truejustice.org/ee/index.php), is currently down. As is the case with all broken links, this is bad for our collective memory of the arguments made and discussed back then.
In regards to this issue in particular, where we had "Knox test" by which people should look at the sides in question as argued by external sites, this is quite negative, if the sites go down and we haven't saved their arguments in question. (I encourage anyone who has cached versions of those sites to also save them in more permanent form)
I'll try to save as much as I can from sources like the wayback machine, but perhaps we here in LessWrong should collectively start considering ways in which we can make our old discussions less dependent on ephemeral external links. Too many links break.