I agree: LW already has a problem because is uses too much idiosyncratic terminology. Please don't make the problem worse: many people reading "ze" in an article will just think you're batshit crazy.

Singluar they is strongly attested all up and down the language. See: http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=1601
and the rest of Language Log in general for wonderfully informative linguistic commentary.

Enough with the nonce pronouns.

When I read that paragraph my first reaction was "what, is this some sort of tricky joke about Yvain's own status-seeking? I'm not sure I get it."

Either "identity" is too vague or I don't understand how you're using it. There's no explanation of what an identity is, why or how people seek an identity, or why they would seek one instead of others. "Village idiot" is an identity and "brilliant seeker of truth" is an identity, but most people, given the choice, would try to conform to the latter.

"Living up to ideals" is a very human-level thought. Where's the mental circuitry behind it? Why would people want to live up to ideals, or even have ideals? What's my motivation?

I think you're entirely right about identity, but that identity is a high-level process that emerges out of the search for status. Exactly how is a whole other post, but I think a lot of the research you mention is in the fields of contingencies of self-worth, ie how our self-esteem comes from lots of different sources. We then value or devalue those sources in order to maximize our own self-esteem. I'm pretty smart but not too strong, so I come up with a worldview in which intellect is much more important than physical strength, and my identities, like "rationalist" and "leftist with a side of libertarianism" develop partly out of what helps me affirm that story that leads to my high status and high self-worth.

I disagree about the attitude versus results thing. One of the posts I still have to make in this sequence argues that this mechanism is what drives so many people into roles that can't receive feedback. For example, you won't find many poor people priding themselves on how rich they are, or too many stupid people priding themselves on how book-smart and well-educated they are, but anyone can pride themselves on how moral they are and how correct their political beliefs are, and most people do. Likewise, the 9-11 Truther example and other conspiracies of fact tend to form around questions that are hard to resolve.

Also, although you use the example of "shaman", there weren't that many roles in the EEA, shamans are probably a pretty late development (first ceremonial burial isn't until 100,000 BC or so), and everything else came even later.

Summary: I think you're right about roles and identity, but the goal of this post is to deconstruct "identity" into moving parts.

We already have a lot of that going on in our society. Is "success" measured by how much money you win? how much money you show off? how much money you save? how famous you are? how hard-working you are? How creative you are? How good-looking you are? How high in a formal hierarchy you are? How many people are under your supervision? How many women you sleep with? How few men you sleep with? How loyal to your country you are? How skillful a lover you are? How good-looking your wife is? How rich and powerful your husband is? How many people visit your website? How many people read your book? How much critics praise your book? How smart you are? How open minded you are? How compassionate you are? How sincere you are? How original you are? How many friends you have? How many levels at World of Warcraft you are? How strong you are? How good a fighter you are?

So many scales to judge people, you're bound to find one or several on which you're better than most people.

A big part of the gap between left-wing and right-wing is caused by two groups with different standards trying to establish their standard as the right one, that's the most worthy of praise.

Yes, signaling loyalty to whatever categories you belong to looks to me like a slightly stronger motivation for most people than signaling status. Related to both is signaling conformity to people's stereotypes regarding the categories you fit into, e.g. fitting in.

Relevantly, in American culture fitting in and narrow in group loyalties are denegrated by popular culture while the attempt go succeed, e.g. to gain status especially in contests, is strongly promoted. How many heroes of American stories fit in? How many succeed against all odds? Contrast to medieval or ancient stories where trying to raise one's status might be hubris or invite the evil eye.

A neat example of this point was the instantaneous display of American flags after 9/11 in most comunities. As David Foster Wallace's article at the time illustrates, the people couldn't effectively articulate why the urge to participate in this way was so strong, but the explanation of "showing you identify with and support a particular group over and above other loyalties" makes perfect sense of it all.

(Of course, once flag-displaying reaches a critical mass within a community, the pressures of conformity suffice as an explanation; but the speed with which communities ubiquitously reached that threshold has to be explained otherwise.)

...that there was a much simpler explanation than the apologist and the revolutionary for the phenomenon discussed in that post...

You can't just say there's a simpler explanation and then not give it!

...Well, you can, but it's rather cruel.

So what did you find?

Most unpopular beliefs are false. However, if everyone subscribed to strict majoritarianism and never took up unpopular beliefs, intellectual progress would cease completely. There must come a point at which cost we pay in wasted effort because of false unpopular beliefs is worth the payoff in progress through new ideas, which of course all start off unpopular. So while I'd like 9-11 truthers to see the error of their beliefs, I'd like to achieve that through argument based on fact, rather than through simply pointing out that everyone disagrees with them.

Also, of course, strict majoritarianism is self-defeating, since it's a pretty unpopular stance in itself.

Variations on this theme have certainly come up. This site says it's about rationality, yet the local consensus is weird or deviant, what if that's being produced by the very same irrationality mechanisms that you all write about? Lots of people have posed that question.

With respect to your comparison: The idea that this will be the century of artificial intelligence is commonplace now. Silicon Valley has not quite become Singularity Valley, but it is extremely common for people who work in the computer industry, even very senior ones, to now anticipate a future that is radically science-fictional in character. It would only be a small number of your "very smart and accomplished people" who even have a considered opinion, pro or con, on Eliezer's specific philosophy, but I don't think his statement that you quote is especially unusual or anomalous for its time.

You could say something similar about the 9-11 Truthers too - that they are part of the zeitgeist - though in locating their social support base, you'll find it's identifiably different to the culture in which singularity ideas are most potent. The generalization is far from universal, but I would say that singularity believers tend to be people from technical or scientific subcultures who feel personally empowered by the rise of technology, whereas 9-11 conspiracy believers are politically and socially minded and feel disempowered by the state of the world.

I should clarify. I did not mean to insult Eliezer - I think that he's a well intentioned and very brilliant guy. I also was not attempting to advocate majoritarian epistemology. Also, I acknowledge that even if Eliezer is misguided about in his beliefs about his future, there are clearly other possible explanations besides "that other kind of status."

To refine my question: When one adopts a view which

(a) Deviates from mainstream beliefs

(b) Is flattering to oneself

(c) Is comprehensive in scope and implications

one should be vigilant about the possibility that one is being influenced by desire for "that other kind of status."

Eliezer's views about the expected value of SIAI's activities seem to meet each of criteria (a), (b) and (c) fairly strongly. This does not mean that his views are wrong, but it does make me reluctant to take them very seriously without evidence that he (and others who hold such views) have exhibited a high level of vigilance about being influenced for desire for "that other kind of status" in connection with these views.

Is there anywhere where I can find evidence that Eliezer and others who share his views have exhibited such a high level of vigilance toward possibility of being influenced by a desire for "that other kind of status" in connection with their views about the expected value of SIAI's activities?

[Edited for formatting.]

I haven't read any literature on this issue specifically, but I suggest that most such literature would have a high tendency to be biased by societal pressures.

My experience is that women in certain kinds of overtly female-centric social situations (e.g. feminism communities, fat acceptance communities, some subsections of the disability community) are just as concerned with status as men are in normal circumstances. Women in mixed-gender social situations seem to tend to automatically assume that they're considered outsiders, and react to that by defending each other and deferring to authority. They also seem to assume that attempting to gain status in such situations is futile, or can only be achieved by playing to the stereotypes of how women are supposed to behave, depending on the situation. (These assumptions may, in fact, be correct in most situations.) That assumption of outsider-ness seems to me like it would also manifest as a heightened awareness of identity, as identity is an important part of the situation at hand.

It is a sad fact about this world that most people are mediocre and obscure, so how can they be deluded about that?

I had delusions of relative mediocrity for years, though I don't see them as mental illness, just morality tinged former belief, my equivalent of having been a theist perhaps. OTOH, it might be more accurate to say that such delusions also have an element of laziness and of desire to avoid responsibility. Arguably I didn't think that I was less capable than I was. More like I didn't see the opportunities to take risks, work harder, seek diverse experiences, challenge assumptions and take on more responsibility, etc that I now do see and which lead to more ability growth.

Nick Bostrom, seems to me to still be held back by similar delusions, and I see them as his major weakness.

If a person has delusions of mediocrity or obscurity, how would we know? Most people aren't Extremely Impressive, and someone who actually is Extremely Impressive but insists otherwise is "just being modest".

More specifically, we're evolved to seek experiences that correlate with going up in status.