Previously in seriesThe So-Called Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle

"A human researcher only sees a particle in one place at one time."  At least that's what everyone goes around repeating to themselves.  Personally, I'd say that when a human researcher looks at a quantum computer, they quite clearly see particles not behaving like they're in one place at a time.  In fact, you have never in your life seen a particle "in one place at a time" because they aren't.

Nonetheless, when you construct a big measuring instrument that is sensitive to a particle's location—say, the measuring instrument's behavior depends on whether a particle is to the left or right of some dividing line—then you, the human researcher, see the screen flashing "LEFT", or "RIGHT", but not a mixture like "LIGFT".

As you might have guessed from reading about decoherence and Heisenberg, this is because we ourselves are governed by the laws of quantum mechanics and subject to decoherence.

The standpoint of the Feynman path integral suggests viewing the evolution of a quantum system as a sum over histories, an integral over ways the system "could" behave—though the quantum evolution of each history still depends on things like the second derivative of that component of the amplitude distribution; it's not a sum over classical histories.  And "could" does not mean possibility in the logical sense; all the amplitude flows are real events...

Nonetheless, a human being can try to grasp a quantum system by imagining all the ways that something could happen, and then adding up all the little arrows that flow to identical outcomes.  That gets you something of the flavor of the real quantum physics, of amplitude flows between volumes of configuration space.

Now apply this mode of visualization to a sensor measuring an atom—say, a sensor measuring whether an atom is to the left or right of a dividing line.

Superposition2 Which is to say:  The sensor and the atom undergo some physical interaction in which the final state of the sensor depends heavily on whether the atom is to the left or right of a dividing line.  (I am reusing some previous diagrams, so this is not an exact depiction; but you should be able to use your own imagination at this point.)

EntanglecloudYou may recognize this as the entangling interaction described in "Decoherence". A quantum system that starts out highly factorizable, looking plaid and rectangular, that is, independent, can evolve into an entangled system as the formerly-independent parts interact among themselves.

So you end up with an amplitude distribution that contains two blobs of amplitude—a blob of amplitude with the atom on the left, and the sensor saying "LEFT"; and a blob of amplitude with the atom on the right, and the sensor saying "RIGHT".

For a sensor to measure an atom is to become entangled with it—for the state of the sensor to depend on the state of the atom—for the two to become correlated.  In a classical system, this is true only on a probabilistic level.  In quantum physics it is a physically real state of affairs.

To observe a thing is to entangle yourself with it. You may recall my having previously said things that sound a good deal like this, in describing how cognition obeys the laws of thermodynamics, and, much earlier, talking about how rationality is a phenomenon within causality.  It is possible to appreciate this in a purely philosophical sense, but quantum physics helps drive the point home.

Ampl1 Let's say you've got an Atom, whose position has amplitude bulges on the left and on the right.  We can regard the Atom's distribution as a sum (addition, not multiplication) of the left bulge and the right bulge:

Atom = (Atom-LEFT + Atom-RIGHT)

Also there's a Sensor in a ready-to-sense state, which we'll call BLANK:

Sensor = Sensor-BLANK

By hypothesis, the system starts out in a state of quantum independence—the Sensor hasn't interacted with the Atom yet.  So:

System = (Sensor-BLANK) * (Atom-LEFT + Atom-RIGHT)

Sensor-BLANK is an amplitude sub-distribution, or sub-factor, over the joint positions of all the particles in the sensor.  Then you multiply this distribution by the distribution (Atom-LEFT + Atom-RIGHT), which is the sub-factor for the Atom's position.  Which gets you the joint configuration space over all the particles in the system, the Sensor and the Atom.

Quantum evolution is linear, which means that Evolution(A + B) = Evolution(A) + Evolution(B).  We can understand the behavior of this whole distribution by understanding its parts.  Not its multiplicative factors, but its additive components.  So now we use the distributive rule of arithmetic, which, because we're just adding and multiplying complex numbers, works just as usual:

System = (Sensor-BLANK) * (Atom-LEFT + Atom-RIGHT)
           = (Sensor-BLANK * Atom-LEFT) + (Sensor-BLANK * Atom-RIGHT)

Now, the volume of configuration space corresponding to (Sensor-BLANK * Atom-LEFT) evolves into (Sensor-LEFT * Atom-LEFT).

Which is to say:  Particle positions for the sensor being in its initialized state and the Atom being on the left, end up sending their amplitude flows to final configurations in which the Sensor is in a LEFT state, and the Atom is still on the left.

So we have the evolution:

(Sensor-BLANK * Atom-LEFT) + (Sensor-BLANK * Atom-RIGHT)
        =>
(Sensor-LEFT * Atom-LEFT) + (Sensor-RIGHT * Atom-RIGHT)

By hypothesis, Sensor-LEFT is a different state from Sensor-RIGHT—otherwise it wouldn't be a very sensitive Sensor.  So the final state doesn't factorize any further; it's entangled.

But this entanglement is not likely to manifest in difficulties of calculation.  Suppose the Sensor has a little LCD screen that's flashing "LEFT" or "RIGHT". This may seem like a relatively small difference to a human, but it involves avogadros of particles—photons, electrons, entire molecules—occupying different positions.

So, since the states Sensor-LEFT and Sensor-RIGHT are widely separated in the configuration space, the volumes (Sensor-LEFT * Atom-LEFT) and (Sensor-RIGHT * Atom-RIGHT) are even more widely separated.

The LEFT blob and the RIGHT blob in the amplitude distribution can be considered separately; they won't interact.  There are no plausible Feynman paths that end up with both LEFT and RIGHT sending amplitude to the same joint configuration.  There would have to be a Feynman path from LEFT, and a Feynman path from RIGHT, in which all the quadrillions of differentiated particles ended up in the same places.  So the amplitude flows from LEFT and RIGHT don't intersect, and don't interfere.

PrecoheredYou may recall this principle from "Decoherence", for how a sensitive interaction can decohere two interacting blobs of amplitude, into two noninteracting blobs.Decohered

Formerly, the Atom-LEFT and Atom-RIGHT states were close enough in configuration space, that the blobs could interact with each other—there would be Feynman paths where an atom on the left ended up on the right.  Or Feynman paths for both an atom on the left, and an atom on the right, to end up in the middle.

Now, however, the two blobs are decohered.  For LEFT to interact with RIGHT, it's not enough for just the Atom to end up on the right.  The Sensor would have to spontaneously leap into a state where it was flashing "RIGHT" on screen.  Likewise with any particles in the environment which previously happened to be hit by photons for the screen flashing "LEFT".  Trying to reverse decoherence is like trying to unscramble an egg.

And when a human being looks at the Sensor's little display screen... or even just stands nearby, with quintillions of particles slightly influenced by gravity... then, under exactly the same laws, the system evolves into:

(Human-LEFT * Sensor-LEFT * Atom-LEFT) + (Human-RIGHT * Sensor-RIGHT * Atom-RIGHT)

Thus, any particular version of yourself only sees the sensor registering one result.

That's it—the big secret of quantum mechanics.  As physical secrets go, it's actually pretty damn big.  Discovering that the Earth was not the center of the universe, doesn't hold a candle to realizing that you're twins.

That you, yourself, are made of particles, is the fourth and final key to recovering the classical hallucination.  It's why you only ever see the universe from within one blob of amplitude, and not the vastly entangled whole.

Asking why you can't see Schrodinger's Cat as simultaneously dead and alive, is like an Ebborian asking:  "But if my brain really splits down the middle, why do I only ever remember finding myself on either the left or the right?  Why don't I find myself on both sides?"

Because you're not outside and above the universe, looking down.  You're in the universe.

Your eyes are not an empty window onto the soul, through which the true state of the universe leaks in to your mind.  What you see, you see because your brain represents it: because your brain becomes entangled with it: because your eyes and brain are part of a continuous physics with the rest of reality.

You only see nearby objects, not objects light-years away, because photons from those objects can't reach you, therefore you can't see them.  By a similar locality principle, you don't interact with distant configurations.

When you open your eyes and see your shoelace is untied, that event happens within your brain.  A brain is made up of interacting neurons.  If you had two separate groups of neurons that never interacted with each other, but did interact among themselves, they would not be a single computer.  If one group of neurons thought "My shoelace is untied", and the other group of neurons thought "My shoelace is tied", it's difficult to see how these two brains could possibly contain the same consciousness.

And if you think all this sounds obvious, note that, historically speaking, it took more than two decades after the invention of quantum mechanics for a physicist to publish that little suggestion.  People really aren't used to thinking of themselves as particles.

The Ebborians have it a bit easier, when they split.  They can see the other sides of themselves, and talk to them.

But the only way for two widely separated blobs of amplitude to communicate—to have causal dependencies on each other—would be if there were at least some Feynman paths leading to identical configurations from both starting blobs.

Once one entire human brain thinks "Left!", and another entire human brain thinks "Right!", then it's extremely unlikely for all of the particles in those brains, and all of the particles in the sensors, and all of the nearby particles that interacted, to coincidentally end up in approximately the same configuration again.

It's around the same likelihood as your brain spontaneously erasing its memories of seeing the sensor and going back to its exact original state; while nearby, an egg unscrambles itself and a hamburger turns back into a cow.

So the decohered amplitude-blobs don't interact.  And we never get to talk to our other selves, nor can they speak to us.

Of course, this doesn't mean that the other amplitude-blobs aren't there any more, any more than we should think that a spaceship suddenly ceases to exist when it travels over the cosmological horizon (relative to us) of an expanding universe.

(Oh, you thought that post on belief in the implied invisible was part of the Zombie sequence?  No, that was covert preparation for the coming series on quantum mechanics.

You can go through line by line and substitute the arguments, in fact.

Remember that the next time some commenter snorts and says, "But what do all these posts have to do with your Artificial Intelligence work?")

Disturbed by the prospect of there being more than one version of you?  But as Max Tegmark points out, living in a spatially infinite universe already implies that an exact duplicate of you exists somewhere, with probability 1.  In all likelihood, that duplicate is no more than 10^(1029) lightyears away.  Or 10^(1029) meters away, with numbers of that magnitude it's pretty much the same thing.

(Stop the presses!  Shocking news!  Scientists have announced that you are actually the duplicate of yourself 10^(1029) lightyears away!  What you thought was "you" is really just a duplicate of you.)

You also get the same Big World effect from the inflationary scenario in the Big Bang, which buds off multiple universes.  And both spatial infinity and inflation are more or less standard in the current model of physics.  So living in a Big World, which contains more than one person who resembles you, is a bullet you've pretty much got to bite—though none of the guns are certain, physics is firing that bullet at you from at least three different directions.

Maybe later I'll do a post about why you shouldn't panic about the Big World.  You shouldn't be drawing many epistemic implications from it, let alone moral implications.  As Greg Egan put it, "It all adds up to normality."  Indeed, I sometimes think of this as Egan's Law.

 

Part of The Quantum Physics Sequence

Next post: "The Conscious Sorites Paradox"

Previous post: "Where Experience Confuses Physicistss"

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Hopefully and Jess,

I understand what you're saying, but I truly and honestly believe that quantum physics as it works in the real universe truly is a hell of a lot simpler than the arguments that people have about quantum physics. I think the arguments are overcomplicated and pointless. Every time I even mention their existence, I worry whether I'm unnecessarily confusing the readers.

Let's start with the simple version. It's even the majority version - no, not the unanimous version, but the majority version among theoretical physicists, yes.

I'm not sure it's possible to teach quantum physics in blog posts if you try to teach the arguments too. The universe is simpler than our arguments about the universe.

If you want a dutifully gracious introduction to quantum physics that carefully acknowledges all the different positions and tries to explain their supporting arguments - treating all sides with respect, and dismissing no idea still believed by a substantial faction of physicists - then there are plenty of books out there which will be happy to confuse the hell out of you.

Greg Egan also said:

"Though a handful of self-described Transhumanists are thinking rationally about real prospects for the future, the overwhelming majority might as well belong to a religious cargo cult based on the notion that self-modifying AI will have magical powers."

Maybe it's time to stop holding up Greg Egan like some kind of icon.

"But what do all these posts have to do with your Artificial Intelligence work?"

Some of us are in fact pleased by how closely this does have to do with your AI work.

Jess Reidel: I enjoy your take on Quantum Mechanics, Eliezer, and I recommend this blog to everyone I know. I agree with you that Copenhagen untenable and the MWI is the current best idea. But you talk about some of your ideas like it's obvious and accepted by anyone who isn't an idiot. This does your readers a disservice.

I realize that this is a blog and not a refereed journal, so I can't expect you to follow all the rules. But I can appeal to your commitment to honesty in asking you to express the uncertainty of your ideas and to defer when necessary to the academic establishment.

I mentioned the fact that there were problems with mangled worlds, but admit that I didn't mention what they were (e.g., seeming to predict that we should find ourselves in a very high-entropy world). In fact, the probability I assign to mangled worlds is below 50% - I just think it is a beautiful exemplar of what a non-mysterious explanation should look like. I'm sorry if this is not clear; I should make that point in an upcoming post explicitly about the Born probabilities.

The main problem with MWI is the Born probabilities - which I did mention, at length. I am not aware of any serious problems with MWI besides the Born probabilities. I will discuss continuity and choice of basis in upcoming days.

I will attempt to establish in upcoming posts that all remaining quantum theories worthy of being taken seriously are many-worlds theories. Hidden variables are experimentally disproved; quantum collapse is unphysical. The non-many-worlds theories are not just wrong, they are silly. Academic physics has been committing a Type II silliness error, where something is very silly but academia views it as not silly.

This is a strong statement, but it is what I will be attempting to establish. I hope that, from this perspective, it will be clear why I have delayed talking about complex craziness until simple sanity is established as a foundation for discussion thereof.

Yes, I talk about these ideas as if they are obvious. They are. It's important to remember that while learning quantum mechanics. It's not difficult unless you make it difficult. Just because certain academics are currently doing so, is no reason for me to do the same. I explicitly said at the outset (in "Quantum Explanations") that the views I presented would not be a uniform consensus among physicists, but I was going to leave out the controversies until later, so I could teach the version that I think is simple and sane. Bayesianism before frequentism.

I thought I was taking Tegmark's word on infinite universes and inflation, but I would seem to have misinterpreted that word, as verified by Wikipedia; my apologies to my readers. I've edited accordingly. It is not an important point except for people having emotional problems with many-worlds.

I just wanted to say I've benefited greatly from this series, and especially from the last few posts. I'd studied some graduate quantum mechanics, but bailed out before Feynman paths, decoherence, etc; and from what I'd experienced with it, I was beginning to think an intuitive explanation of (one interpretation of) quantum mechanics was nigh-impossible. Thanks for proving me wrong, Eliezer.

The argument (from elegance/Occam's Razor) for the many-worlds interpretation seems impressively strong, too. I'll be interested to read the exchanges when you let the one-world advocates have their say.

"... the overwhelming majority might as well belong to a religious cargo cult based on the notion that self-modifying AI will have magical powers."

"Maybe you can admire someone who directly thinks you're a crackpot, but I can't."

I have a high regard for most extropians (a subset of Transhumans, I think) I know well, but that doesn't make me believe that the Egan line is more than hyperbole at most. I don't take it as a slur against anyone whose name I know. I've certainly seen evidence that the majority wouldn't be able to distinguish the magical explanations that appear.

And the fact that Charles Stross thinks that discussing Extropianism is attractive to his market makes me think Egan has more truth on his side.

But I also want to mention Egan's "Diaspora". I bring it often as a great fictional depiction of an AI awakening. I know, I know. "Arguing from fictional evidence." But many people expect coming to awareness to be magic, and Egan shows how it could happen in a step-by-step manner.

"Yes, I talk about these ideas as if they are obvious. They are. It's important to remember that while learning quantum mechanics. It's not difficult unless you make it difficult. Just because certain academics are currently doing so, is no reason for me to do the same. I explicitly said at the outset (in "Quantum Explanations") that the views I presented would not be a uniform consensus among physicists, but I was going to leave out the controversies until later, so I could teach the version that I think is simple and sane. Bayesianism before frequentism."

That self-flattering interpretation of the first 4 sentences of this quote is pretty clearly not what Jess Reidel meant. He meant that you promote some of your ideas like there is no significant probability that they're wrong ("obvious" in that sense), when expert consensus differs from that assessment. As for the last two sentences, perhaps he'd be satisfied with a more prominent and obvious disclaimer. For example, at the moment of presentation of the simple and sane version of each explanation, clearly noting that reasonable controversies exist.

Elsewhere in his post he was pretty clear that your attempts to

Maybe it's time to stop holding up Greg Egan like some kind of icon.

Why? Quarantine and Permutation City are still really good books. Egan is a icon of idea-based science fiction, not an icon of futurism.

"But you talk about some of your ideas like it's obvious and accepted by anyone who isn't an idiot. This does your readers a disservice.

I realize that this is a blog and not a refereed journal, so I can't expect you to follow all the rules. But I can appeal to your commitment to honesty in asking you to express the uncertainty of your ideas and to defer when necessary to the academic establishment."

Eliezer this is really great advice. Please take it.

"And both spatial infinity and inflation are standard in the current model of physics."

As mentioned by a commenter above, spatial infinity is by no means required or implied by physical observation. Non-compact space-times are allowed by general relativity, but so are compact tori (which is a very real possibility) or a plethora of bizarre geometries which have been ruled out by experimental evidence.

Inflation is an interesting theory which agrees well with the small (relative to other areas of physics) amount of cosmological data which has been collected. However, the data by no means implies inflation. In fact, the term "inflation" refers to a huge zoo of models which have many unexplained parameters which can be tuned to fit the date. Physicists are far from absolutely confident in the inflationary picture.

Furthermore, there are serious, serious problems with Many Worlds Interpretation (and likewise for Mangled Worlds), which you neglect to mention here.

I enjoy your take on Quantum Mechanics, Eliezer, and I recommend this blog to everyone I know. I agree with you that Copenhagen untenable and the MWI is the current best idea. But you talk about some of your ideas like it's obvious and accepted by anyone who isn't an idiot. This does your readers a disservice.

I realize that this is a blog and not a refereed journal, so I can't expect you to follow all the rules. But I can appeal to your commitment to honesty in asking you to express the uncertainty of your ideas and to defer when necessary to the academic establishment.

But you talk about some of your ideas like it's obvious and accepted by anyone who isn't an idiot.

In the prolog to the QM sequence he does actually repeatedly say <this all is my opinion and others have different opinions and I'll talk about that later>

Maybe you can admire someone who directly thinks you're a crackpot, but I can't.

I think people who view me as a crackpot are a valuable antidote to people who drink the same Kool-Aid as I do. It is entirely beside the point if it happens to be the Kool-Aid of Truth, because all Kool-Aid tastes truthy to those who drink it.

BTW, are you going to cover why the probability of a configuration is the square of its amplitude? Or if that was somehow already answered by the Ebborians, could I get a translation? :)

I think this has been the best post so far. I'd like to answer one of my previous questions to make sure I am grokking this; please weigh in if I am off. Here was my question:

Q: Am I correct in assuming that [the amplitude distribution] is independent of (observations, "wave function collapses", or whatever it is when we say that we find a particle at a certain point)?

A: As I suspected, a bit of a Wrong Question. But yes, there is only one amplitude distribution that progresses over time

Q: For example, let's I have a particle that is "probably" going to go in a straight to from x to y, i.e. at each point in time there is a huge bulge in the amplitude distribution at the appropriate point on the line from x to y. If I observe the particle on the opposite side of the moon at some point (i.e. where the amplitude is non-zero, but still tiny), does the particle still have the same probability as before of "jumping" back onto the line from x to y?

A: As was mentioned to me when I first asked this question, the probability of me observing the particle "jump back" is near-zero. When (I think) I realize now is that the reason this is true is that

[Brain being in a state where it remembered particle on the moon 1 second ago] * [Brain being in state where it sees particle "back" on the original line]

is close to zero. (This is of course ignoring the fact that there is no such thing as "this particle" vs "that particle". I'm pretending this is a new class of particle of which there is only one in the universe. Or something).

So what you're saying is that God does not play dice, and that frequentism is fundamentally true.

Eliezer, I think your usage of "Standard Model" is different from that of physicists.