Bad reasons for a rationalist to lose

Reply to: Practical Advice Backed By Deep Theories

Inspired by what looks like a very damaging reticence to embrace and share brain hacks that might only work for some of us, but are not backed by Deep Theories. In support of tinkering with brain hacks and self experimentation where deep science and large trials are not available.

Eliezer has suggested that, before he will try a new anti-akraisia brain hack:

[…] the advice I need is from someone who reads up on a whole lot of experimental psychology dealing with willpower, mental conflicts, ego depletion, preference reversals, hyperbolic discounting, the breakdown of the self, picoeconomics, etcetera, and who, in the process of overcoming their own akrasia, manages to understand what they did in truly general terms - thanks to experiments that give them a vocabulary of cognitive phenomena that actually exist, as opposed to phenomena they just made up.  And moreover, someone who can explain what they did to someone else, thanks again to the experimental and theoretical vocabulary that lets them point to replicable experiments that ground the ideas in very concrete results, or mathematically clear ideas.

This doesn't look to me like an expected utility calculation, and I think it should. It looks like an attempt to justify why he can't be expected to win yet. It just may be deeply wrongheaded.

I submit that we don't "need" (emphasis in original) this stuff, it'd just be super cool if we could get it. We don't need to know that the next brain hack we try will work, and we don't need to know that it's general enough that it'll work for anyone who tries it; we just need the expected utility of a trial to be higher than that of the other things we could be spending that time on.

So… this isn't other-optimizing, it's a discussion of how to make decisions under uncertainty. What do all of us need to make a rational decision about which brain hacks to try?

  • We need a goal: Eliezer has suggested "I want to hear how I can overcome akrasia - how I can have more willpower, or get more done with less mental pain". I'd push cost in with something like "to reduce the personal costs of akraisia by more than the investment in trying and implementing brain hacks against it plus the expected profit on other activities I could undertake with that time".
  • We need some likelihood estimates:
    • Chance of a random brain hack working on first trial: ?, second trial: ?, third: ?
    • Chance of a random brain hack working on subsequent trials (after the third - the noise of mood, wakefulness, etc. is large, so subsequent trials surely have non-zero chance of working, but that chance will probably diminish): →0
    • Chance of a popular brain hack working on first (second, third) trail: ? (GTD is lauded by many many people; your brother in law's homebrew brain hack is less well tried)
    • Chance that a brain hack that would work in the first three trials would seem deeply compelling on first being exposed to it: ?
      (can these books be judged by their covers? how does this chance vary with the type of exposure? what would you need to do to understand enough about a hack that would work to increase its chance of seeming deeply compelling on first exposure?)
    • Chance that a brain hack that would not work in the first three trials would seem deeply compelling on first being exposed to it: ? (false positives)
    • Chance of a brain hack recommended by someone in your circle working on first (second, third) trial: ?
    • Chance that someone else will read up "on a whole lot of experimental psychology dealing with willpower, mental conflicts, ego depletion, preference reversals, hyperbolic discounting, the breakdown of the self, picoeconomics, etcetera, and who, in the process of overcoming their own akrasia, manages to understand what they did in truly general terms - thanks to experiments that give them a vocabulary of cognitive phenomena that actually exist, as opposed to phenomena they just made up.  And moreover, someone who can explain what they did to someone else, thanks again to the experimental and theoretical vocabulary that lets them point to replicable experiments that ground the ideas in very concrete results, or mathematically clear ideas", all soon: ? (pretty small?)
    • What else do we need to know?
  • We need some time/cost estimates (these will vary greatly by proposed brain hack):
    • Time required to stage a personal experiment on the hack: ?
    • Time to review and understand the hack in sufficient detail to estimate the time required to stage a personal experiment?
    • What else do we need?

… and, what don't we need?

  • A way to reject the placebo effect - if it wins, use it. If it wins for you but wouldn't win for someone else, then they have a problem. We may choose to spend some effort helping others benefit from this hack, but that seems to be a different task - it's irrelevant to our goal.


How should we decide how much time to spend gathering data and generating estimates on matters such as this? How much is Eliezer setting himself up to lose, and how much am I missing the point?

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Awesomely summarized, so much so that I don't know what else to say, except to perhaps offer this complementary anecdote.

Yesterday, I was giving a workshop on what I jokingly call "The Jedi Mind Trick" -- really the set of principles that makes monoidealism techniques (such as "count to 10 and do it") either work or not work. Towards the end, a woman in the group was having some difficulty applying it, and I offered to walk through an example with her.

She picked the task of organizing some files, and I explained to her what to say and picture in her mind, and asked, "What comes up in your mind right now?"

And she said, "well, I'm on a phone call, I can't organize them right now." And I said "Right, that's standard objection #1 - "I'm doing something else". So now do it again..." [I repeated the instructions]. "What comes to mind?"

She says, "Well, it's that it'll be time to do it later".

"Standard objection #2: it's not time right now, or I don't have enough time. Great. We're moving right along. Do it again. What comes to mind?"

"Well, now I'm starting to see more of what I'd actually be doing if I were doing it, the visualization is getting a lot clearer."

"Terrific, do it again. Now, don't try to actually do the task, just pay attention to what you're seeing and feeling, and you may begin to notice some of your muscles beginning to respond, like they're trying to actually do some of the things you're picturing, like starting to twitch..."

And she burst out laughing, because, she said, her legs had already started twitching and she was feeling like, "well, the files are right over there we could just go and get started..."

Had she given up at standard objection #1 or #2, she wouldn't have learned the technique or gotten the result. But it's not the content of the objection that matters, it's that ANY objection that stops you from actually trying something useful, means you fail. You lose. You are not being a smart, rational skeptic, you're being a dumbass loser.

In the workshop, I explained how our own objections and doubts are also doing the Jedi Mind Trick... but on US. "It's not time now..." they say, and like a hypnotized stormtrooper we nod and agree, "It's not time now." And it doesn't matter if those doubts are saying, "It's not time now" or "It's not peer-reviewed" -- because you still lose, either way.

However, if you simply ignore those doubts and objections, and continue what you're doing, they cannot stop you. If the objection you think is real, is in fact real, well, then you've only lost a little time by trying. But if you believe an objection that isn't real, then you've lost much, much more than that.

Much of the time, the primary function of a (good) personal coach or teacher -- whether in pickup, personal development, or even business and marketing! -- is simply to drag someone (kicking and screaming, if necessary) past their objections into actually doing something the teacher or coach already knows will work.

And when that happens, what the student usually finds is that it isn't really as hard as they thought it would be, or that, yes, that crazy mumbo-jumbo actually works, no matter how irrational it might have sounded before they had any personal point of reference.

The woman on the call only needed about two minutes, to try a technique four times in a row and get a result. If she'd been doing it on her own, she might have given up after only one try. And a lot of folks on LW would likely not have tried even that once!

On LW, I mostly bide with polite patience those people who talk about the stuff I teach as if it's a matter of variation from person to person as to whether stuff works, or that things sometimes work and sometimes not, or whatever, blah blah fudge factor nonsense they individually prefer. That's all well and good here, because those people are not my clients.

But if I were to accept that sort of bullshit from one of my clients, then I would have failed them. It's all very well and good for the client to come to me believing that his or her problems are special and unique and that, in all the world, they are the worst person ever at doing something. But if they leave me still thinking that, then I have not done my job.

My job is to say, fuck that bullshit. Do this. No, not that, this. Good. Do it again. Again. That's better. Now do this.

Dunno about rationality, but ISTM that's how a dojo is actually supposed to work. If the master sat there listening to people's inane theories about how they need to punch differently than everybody else, or their insistence that they really need to understand a complete theory of combat, complete with statistical validation against a control group, before they can even raise a single fist in practice, that master would have failed their students AND their Art.

Just as EY fails his students and his art by the public positions he has taken on his weight and akrasia. To fail at solving those problems is fine. To excuse his failure to even try is not, even by the rules of his own art.

(And remember, "I don't have time" is just standard objection #2.)

He's tried, or he wouldn't have had the material to make those posts.

I appreciate your comments, and they're a good counterpoint to EY's point of view. But the fact that you need to make an assumption in order to be an effective teacher, because it's true most of the time, doesn't mean it's always true. You are making an expected-value calculation as a teacher, perhaps subconsciously:

  • If I accept that my approach doesn't work well with some people, and work with those people to try to find an approach that works for them, I will be able to effectively coach 50 people per year (or whatever).
  • If I dismiss the people whom my approach doesn't work well for as losers, and focus on the people whom my approach works well for, I'll be able to effectively coach 500 people per year.

You are also taking EY's claim that not every technique works well for every person, and caricaturing it as the claim that there is a 1-1 correspondence between people and techniques that work for them. He never said that.

The specific comments Eliezer has made, about people erroneously assuming that what worked for them should work for other people, were taken from real life and were, I think, also true and correct. In order to convince me that those specific examples were wrong, you would have to address those specific examples in detail and make a strong case why they were not really as he described them. I would rather see you narrow your claims to something reasonable than make these erroneous blanket denunciations, because they distract from the valuable things you have to say.

You don't need to duke it out with EY over who's the alpha teacher. :)

You are making an expected-value calculation as a teacher, perhaps subconsciously

No. I'm making the assumption that, until someone has actually tried something, they aren't in a position to say whether or not it works. Once someone has actually tried something, and it doesn't work, then I find something else for them to do. I don't give up and say, "oh, well I guess that doesn't work for you, then."

When I do a one-on-one consult, I don't charge someone until and unless they get the result we agree on as a "success" for that consultation. If I can't get the result, I don't get paid, and I'm out the time.

Do I make sure that the definition of "success" is reasonably in scope for what I can accomplish in one session? Sure. But I don't perform any sort of filtering (other than that which may occur by selection or availability bias, e.g. having both motivation and funds) to determine who I work with.

You are also taking EY's claim that not every technique works well for every person, and caricaturing it as the claim that there is a 1-1 correspondence between people and techniques that work for them. He never said that.

I didn't say he did, or that anybody did. What I said is that people assume they are unique and special and nothing will work for them. A LOT of people believe this, because they're under the mistaken impression that they tried 50 different things, when in fact they've been making the same mistakes, 50 different times, without ever being aware of the mistake.

The specific comments Eliezer has made, about people erroneously assuming that what worked for them should work for other people, were taken from real life and were, I think, also true and correct.

No argument there. However, when people assume that what worked for them will work for other people, they are actually mostly right.

What they are mistaken about is that 1) they're actually fully communicating what they did, and that 2) other people will be able to accurately reproduce the internal steps as well as the external and easy-to-describe ones.

So I agree at the level of the result, but I disagree about the cause. At the brain hardware level, human beings are just not that different from one another. We differ more at the software, filtering, and meta-cognitive levels, which is where the details of communication and teaching trip up the transfer of effective techniques.

In order to convince me that those specific examples were wrong,

Why would I want to? My point is only that Eliezer whining about things not working and demanding proof is counterproductive to his own goals and counter to his professed values and art. This is independent of whether he gives up or not, or whose advice or example he seeks.

I would rather see you narrow your claims to something reasonable

What claims do you mean?

No. I'm making the assumption that, until someone has actually tried something, they aren't in a position to say whether or not it works.

This is a wrong assumption. The correctness of a decision to even try something directly depends on how certain you are it'll work. Don't play lotteries, don't hunt bigfoot, but commute to work risking death in a traffic accident.

The correctness of a decision to even try something directly depends on how certain you are it'll work.

...weighed against the expected cost. And for the kind of things we're talking about here, a vast number of things can be tried at relatively small cost compared to one's ultimate desired outcome, since the end result of a search is something you can then go on to use for the rest of your life.

Precisely. There are self-help techniques that can be tried in minutes, even in seconds. I don't see a single reason for not allocating a fraction of one's procrastination time to trying mind hacks or anything else that might help against akrasia.

Say, if my procrastination time is 3 hours per day, I could allocate 10% of that -- 18 minutes. How long does it take to speak a sentence "I will become a syndicated cartoonist"? 10 seconds at maximum -- given 18 minutes, that's 108 repetitions!

But what if it doesn't work? Oh noes, I could kill 108 orcs during that time and perhaps get some green drops!

At the brain hardware level, human beings are just not that different from one another. We differ more at the software, filtering, and meta-cognitive levels, which is where the details of communication and teaching trip up the transfer of effective techniques.

That claim does not match the evidence that I have encountered. Consider, for example, responsiveness to hypnosis. Hypnotic responsiveness as can be measured by the stanford test is found to differ more between fraternal twins raised together than between identical twins raised apart. It also seems to be related to the size of the rostrum region of the corpus callosum.

I agree that people tend to overestimate their own uniqueness and I know this is something that I do myself. Nevertheless, there is clearly one element of human behavior and motivation that is attributable directly to the brain hardware level and I suggest that there are many more.

I would rather see you narrow your claims to something reasonable

What claims do you mean?

The gist of your top-level comment here is that your techniques work for everyone; and if they don't work for someone, it's that person's fault.

The gist of your top-level comment here is that your techniques work for everyone; and if they don't work for someone, it's that person's fault.

Here's the problem: when someone argues that some techniques might not work for some people, their objective is not merely to achieve epistemic accuracy.

Instead, the real point of arguing such a thing is a form of self-handicapping. "Bruce" is saying, "not everything works for everyone... therefore, what you have might not work for me... therefore, I don't have to risk trying and failing."

In other words, the point of saying that not every technique works for everyone is to apply the Fallacy of Grey: not everything works for everybody, therefore all techniques are alike, therefore you cannot compare my performance to anyone else, because maybe your technique just won't work for me. Therefore, I am safe from your judgment.

This is a fully general argument against trying ANY technique, for ANY purpose. It has ZERO to do with who came up with the technique or who's suggesting it; it's just a Litany Against Fear... of failure.

As a rationalist and empiricist, I want to admit the possibility that I could be wrong. However, as an instrumentalist, instructor, and helper-of-people, I'm going to say that, if you allow your logic to excuse your losing, you fail logic, you fail rationality, and you fail life.

So no, I won't be "reasonable", because that would be a failure of rationality. I do not claim that any technique X will always work for all persons; I merely claim that, given a person Y, there is always some technique X that will produce a behavior change.

The point is not to argue that a particular value of X may not work with a particular value of Y, the point is to find X.

(And the search space for X, seen from the "inside view", is about two orders of magnitude smaller than it appears to be from the "outside view".)

Instead, the real point of arguing such a thing is a form of self-handicapping. "Bruce" is saying, "not everything works for everyone... therefore, what you have might not work for me... therefore, I don't have to risk trying and failing."

I'm pretty surprised to see you make this type of argument. Are you really so sure that you have that precise of an understanding of the motives behind everyone who has brought this up? You seem oblivious to the predictable consequences of acting so unreasonably confident in your own theories. Your style alone provokes skepticism, however unwarranted or irrational it may be. Seeing you write this entire line of criticism off as "they're just Brucing" makes me wonder just how much your brand of "instrumental" rationality interferes with your perception of reality.

Seconded.

Here's the problem: when someone argues that some techniques might not work for some people, their objective is not merely to achieve epistemic accuracy. Instead, the real point of arguing such a thing is a form of self-handicapping.

Because of course it is impossible a priori that any technique works for one person but not another. Furthermore, it is impossible for anyone to arrive at this conclusion by an honest mistake. They all have impure motives; furthermore they all have the same particular impure motive; furthermore P. J. Eby knows this by virtue of his vast case experience, in which he has encountered many people making this assertion, and deduced the same impure motive every time.

To quote Karl Popper:

The Freudian analysts emphasized that their theories were constantly verified by their "clinical observations." As for Adler, I was much impressed by a personal experience. Once, in 1919, I reported to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian, but which he found no difficulty in analyzing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings, Although he had not even seen the child. Slightly shocked, I asked him how he could be so sure. "Because of my thousandfold experience," he replied; whereupon I could not help saying: "And with this new case, I suppose, your experience has become thousand-and-one-fold."

I'll say it again. PJ, you need to learn the basics of rationality - in this you are an apprentice and you are making apprentice mistakes. You will either accept this or learn the basics, or not. That's what you would tell a client, I expect, if they were making mistakes this basic according to your understanding of akrasia.

Heh, that Adler anecdote reminds me of a guy I know who tends to believe in conspiracy theories, and who was backing up his belief that the US government is behind 9-11 by saying how evil the US government tends to be. Of course, 9-11 will most likely serve as future evidence of how evil the US government is.

(Not that I can tell whether that's what's going on here)

On LW, I mostly bide with polite patience those people who talk about the stuff I teach as if it's a matter of variation from person to person as to whether stuff works, or that things sometimes work and sometimes not, or whatever, blah blah fudge factor nonsense they individually prefer. That's all well and good here, because those people are not my clients.

On this topic your interpretation of those replying to you here is sometimes not the same as those typing the replies or to that of other observers. This includes the distortion of replies to fit the closest matching 'standard objection'. Were a rationalist sensei to 'accept that sort of bullshit' from a pupil then she would have failed them.

Excellent comment. I have only two objections. First, this statement:

But it's not the content of the objection that matters, it's that ANY objection that stops you from actually trying something useful, means you fail. You lose.

is good on its merits, but I caution everyone to be careful about asserting that some technique or other is "something useful". There are plenty of reasons not to try any random thing that enters into our heads, and even when we're engaged in a blind search, we shouldn't suspend our evaluative functions completely, even though they may be assuming things that blinds us to the solution we need. They also keep us from chopping our legs off when we want to deal with a stubbed toe.

My second objection deals with the following:

If the master sat there listening to people's inane theories about how they need to punch differently than everybody else, or their insistence that they really need to understand a complete theory of combat, complete with statistical validation against a control group, before they can even raise a single fist in practice, that master would have failed their students AND their Art. ust as EY fails his students and his art by the public positions he has taken on his weight and akrasia.

What grounds are there for assigning EY the status of 'master'? Hopefully in a martial arts dojo there are stringent requirements for the demonstration of skill before someone is put in a teaching position, so that even when students aren't personally capable of verifying that the 'master' has actually mastered techniques that are useful, they can productively hold that expectation.

When did EY demonstrate that he's a master, and how did he supposedly do so?

Hopefully in a martial arts dojo there are stringent requirements for the demonstration of skill before someone is put in a teaching position

There really aren't, though one does need to jump through some hoops. That's part of what I like about this analogy.

If the master sat there listening to people's inane theories about how they need to punch differently than everybody else, or their insistence that they really need to understand a complete theory of combat, complete with statistical validation against a control group, before they can even raise a single fist in practice, that master would have failed their students AND their Art.

Even so, as a student, I do want the master to understand a complete theory of combat, complete with statistical validation against a control group.

What is your theory o Master?

it's that ANY objection that stops you from actually trying something useful, means you fail. You lose. You are not being a smart, rational skeptic, you're being a dumbass loser.

So, you still need to know what's likely to be useful. You can waste a lot of time trying stuff that just isn't going to work.

(And, just in case it wasn't clear - I am a long (long long) way from the belief that Eliezer is "a dumbass loser" (which you don't quite say, but it's a confusion I'd like to avoid).)

I'd also add:

  • there's heaps of stuff that's 'useful'. what matters is how useful it is - especially in relation to things that might be more useful. we all have limited time and (other) resources. it's a cost/benefit ratio. the good is the enemy of the great, and all that.

  • often it's unclear how useful something really is, you have to take this into account when you judge whether it's worth your while. and you also have to make a judgement about whether it's even worth your while to try evaluating it... coz there's always heaps and heaps of options and you can't spend your time evaluating them all.

It might be worth separating the claim "Eliezer is wrong about what changes he, personally, should try" from the claim

"It is generally good to try many plausible changes, because:

  1. Some portion will work;
  2. Trying the number of approaches it takes to find an improvement is often less expensive than being stuck in the wrong local optimum;
  3. Many of us humans tend to keep on doing the same old thing because it's easy, comfortable, safe-feeling, or automatic, even when sticking with our routines is not the high-expected-value thing to do. We can benefit from adopting heuristics of action and experimentation to check such tendencies.”

The second claim seems fairly clearly right, at least for some of us. (People may vary in how easily they can try on new approaches, and on what portion of handed-down approaches work for them. OTOH, the ability to easily try new approaches is itself learnable, at least for many of us.) The first claim is considerably less clear, particularly since Eliezer has much data on himself that we do not, and since after trying many hacks for a given not-lightcone-destroying problem without any of the hacks working, expected value calculations can in fact point to directing one’s efforts elsewhere.

Maybe we could abandon Eliezer’s specific case, and try to get into the details of: (a) how to benefit from trying new approaches; and (b) what rules of thumb for what to try, and what to leave alone, yield high expected life-success?

One more reason for the list is that doing new stuff (or doing stuff in new ways, but I repeat myself) promotes neurogenesis.

When you spend time trying out the 1000 popular hacks doing you no good, then you lose. You lose all the time and energy invested in the enterprise, for which you could find a better use.

How do you know anything works, before even thinking about what in particular to try out? How much thought, and how much work is it reasonable to use for investigating a possibility? Intuition, and evidence. Self-help folk notoriously don't give evidence for efficacy of their procedures, which in itself looks like evidence of absence of this efficacy, a reason to believe that you'll only waste time going through the motions. My intuition agrees.

A deep theory is both a tool for constructing unusually powerful techniques, and a way to signal a nontrivial probability of viability of the techniques even prior to experimental testing.

Self-help folk notoriously don't give evidence for efficacy of their procedures

Anecdotal evidence is still evidence.

Note that one of EY's rationality principles is that if you apply arguments selectively, then the smarter you get, the stupider you become.

So, the reason I am referring to this cross-pollination of epistemic standards to an instrumental field as being "dumbass loser" thinking, is because as Richard Bach once put it, "if you argue for your limitations, then sure enough, you get to keep them."

If you require that the "useful" first be "true", then you will never be the one who actually changes anything. At best, you can only be the person who does an experiment to find the "true" in the already-useful... which will already have been adopted by those who were looking for "useful" first.

I think that if there was such a straightforward hack like EY was looking for, he would know about it already. I just don't really believe that a hack like that exists, based on my admittedly meager readings in experimental psychology. Further, I think the idea of a "mind hack" is a cute metaphor, it can be misguided. Computer hackers literally create code that directs processes. We can at best manipulate our outside environment in ways that we hope will affect what is still a very mysterious brain. What EY's looking for would be the result of a well-funded and decades long research project. Unless there truly is a Dharma Initiative looking into these things while staying behind the scenes, I don't think there's going to be a journal article that will provide the profound insight he's looking to fin.

I do want to mention something about Seth Robers, which he sort of casually mentions in the Shangri-La diet. He wrote something along the lines that he was eating much less frequently, eating probably one full meal a day. That's something referred to as intermittent fasting. What the Shangri-La Diet book misses, I would postulate, is how Seth used the no flavor calories to transition to that kind of diet. IF is something being suggested as a way to control calories because people's bodies cue hunger to when their accustomed to eating. If you aren't accustomed to eating, you eat a bit less (since you're only filling your stomach the once, or so goes the idea). I certainly don't think I have the complete picture from noticing that on how diets should now be constructed. But I do feel that Seth Robers, attentive as he is, did not fully consider all the changes he had made, and was considering he reduced meal frequency solely as an aftereffect. In writing his popular book, he did not consider all the hacks that he had put into place for himself.

Akrasia-conquerors will need to find the ways to win against their lesser but still powerful drives. Teachers of akrasia-conquering will need to be able to honestly detail everything that they did, which will probably entail very keen observers as peers and students. The need for a perfect system to be in place before on attempts to overcome akrasia is an example of akrasia.

Wow, I came late to this party.

One takeaway here is, don't reduce your search space to zero if you can help it. If that means that you have to try things without substantial evidence that they'll work, well, it's that or lose, and we're not supposed to lose.

I can think of a few situations where it'd make sense to reduce your search space to zero pending more data, though. The general rule for that seems to be that if you do allow that to happen, whatever reason you have for allowing that to happen is more important to you than the goal you're giving up by not looking for solutions. In situations where you're choosing not to look for solutions to avoid danger, as an example, that makes sense, or if trying the solutions would mean taking resources away from other projects that were also important.

On your reaction to "a way to reject the placebo effect", it's important to distinguish what we are trying to do. If all I care about is fixing a given problem for myself, I don't care whether I solve it by placebo effect or by a repeatable hack.

If I care about figuring out how my brain works, then I will need a way to reject or identify the placebo effect.

You also need to avoid placebo effects if you want the hack to be repeatable (if you run into a similar problem again), generalizable (to work on a wider class of problems), or reliable.

There's also the question of to what extent the placebo effect is actually meaningful when "causing effects in the mind" is the goal.

I am wondering, what are the good reasons for a rationalist to lose?

  • bad luck
  • if it's impossible to win (in that case, just lose less; a semantic difference)
  • if "winning" is defined as something else than achieving what you truly value

That's all of them, I think.

ETA: more in the context of this post, a good reason to lose at some subgoal is if winning at the subgoal can be done only at the cost of losing too much elsewhere.

Another is failure of knowledge. It's possible simply not to know something you need to succeed, at the time you need it. No one can know everything they might possibly need to. It is not irrational, if you did not know that you would need to know beforehand.

The approach laid out in this post is likely to be effective if, your predominant goal is to find a collection of better performing akrasia and willpower hacks.

If, however, finding such hacks is only a possible intermediate goal, then different conclusions can be reached. This is even more telling if improved willpower and akrasia resistance is your intermediate goal - regardless of whether you choose hacks or some other method for realizing it.

Another bad reason for rationalists to lose is to try to win every contest placed in front of them. Choosing your battles is the same as choosing your strategies, just at a higher scale.