Followup to: Why Our Kind Can't Cooperate
One of the likely characteristics of someone who sets out to be a "rationalist" is a lower-than-usual tolerance for flaws in reasoning. This doesn't strictly follow. You could end up, say, rejecting your religion, just because you spotted more or deeper flaws in the reasoning, not because you were, by your nature, more annoyed at a flaw of fixed size. But realistically speaking, a lot of us probably have our level of "annoyance at all these flaws we're spotting" set a bit higher than average.
That's why it's so important for us to tolerate others' tolerance if we want to get anything done together.
For me, the poster case of tolerance I need to tolerate is Ben Goertzel, who among other things runs an annual AI conference, and who has something nice to say about everyone. Ben even complimented the ideas of M*nt*f*x, the most legendary of all AI crackpots. (M*nt*f*x apparently started adding a link to Ben's compliment in his email signatures, presumably because it was the only compliment he'd ever gotten from a bona fide AI academic.) (Please do not pronounce his True Name correctly or he will be summoned here.)
But I've come to understand that this is one of Ben's strengths—that he's nice to lots of people that others might ignore, including, say, me—and every now and then this pays off for him.
And if I subtract points off Ben's reputation for finding something nice to say about people and projects that I think are hopeless—even M*nt*f*x—then what I'm doing is insisting that Ben dislike everyone I dislike before I can work with him.
Is that a realistic standard? Especially if different people are annoyed in different amounts by different things?
But it's hard to remember that when Ben is being nice to so many idiots.
Cooperation is unstable, in both game theory and evolutionary biology, without some kind of punishment for defection. So it's one thing to subtract points off someone's reputation for mistakes they make themselves, directly. But if you also look askance at someone for refusing to castigate a person or idea, then that is punishment of non-punishers, a far more dangerous idiom that can lock an equilibrium in place even if it's harmful to everyone involved.
The danger of punishing nonpunishers is something I remind myself of, say, every time Robin Hanson points out a flaw in some academic trope and yet modestly confesses he could be wrong (and he's not wrong). Or every time I see Michael Vassar still considering the potential of someone who I wrote off as hopeless within 30 seconds of being introduced to them. I have to remind myself, "Tolerate tolerance! Don't demand that your allies be equally extreme in their negative judgments of everything you dislike!"
By my nature, I do get annoyed when someone else seems to be giving too much credit. I don't know if everyone's like that, but I suspect that at least some of my fellow aspiring rationalists are. I wouldn't be surprised to find it a human universal; it does have an obvious evolutionary rationale—one which would make it a very unpleasant and dangerous adaptation.
I am not generally a fan of "tolerance". I certainly don't believe in being "intolerant of intolerance", as some inconsistently hold. But I shall go on trying to tolerate people who are more tolerant than I am, and judge them only for their own un-borrowed mistakes.
Oh, and it goes without saying that if the people of Group X are staring at you demandingly, waiting for you to hate the right enemies with the right intensity, and ready to castigate you if you fail to castigate loudly enough, you may be hanging around the wrong group.
Just don't demand that everyone you work with be equally intolerant of behavior like that. Forgive your friends if some of them suggest that maybe Group X wasn't so awful after all...
Part of the sequence The Craft and the Community
Next post: "You're Calling Who A Cult Leader?"
Previous post: "Why Our Kind Can't Cooperate"
There's a question of whether there's an important difference in kind between sorts of tolerance. Here's an analogy which might or might not work: assume that, in general, a driver of a vehicle drives as fast as they think it is safe for cars to be driven in general. Only impatience would cause them to not tolerate people who drive slower than they; a safety concern could cause them to be upset by people who drive faster, since they consider that speed unsafe. Say you have two people who each drive at 50 mph. One of them tolerates only slower drivers but wants to ticket faster drivers and the other tolerates all drivers. The first driver could have a legitimate issue with the second one. They don't disagree about how fast it's safe to drive - they disagree about whether it is appropriate to expect that safety standard of others. Some kinds of statements are dangerous - perhaps not to the degree or in the way that cars are, but dangerous, like slanderous statements or ones that incite to riot or ones that are lies or ones that betray confidences or ones that mislead the gullible or ones that involve occupied inflammable theatrical venues. Refusing to castigate people who express those kinds of statements might - I'm not confident of this - itself be worthy of censure. Or perhaps I'm missing the point and those aren't the kinds of statements the tolerators of which should be tolerated?