Are wireheads happy?

Related to: Utilons vs. Hedons, Would Your Real Preferences Please Stand Up

And I don't mean that question in the semantic "but what is happiness?" sense, or in the deep philosophical "but can anyone not facing struggle and adversity truly be happy?" sense. I mean it in the totally literal sense. Are wireheads having fun?

They look like they are. People and animals connected to wireheading devices get upset when the wireheading is taken away and will do anything to get it back. And it's electricity shot directly into the reward center of the brain. What's not to like?

Only now neuroscientists are starting to recognize a difference between "reward" and "pleasure", or call it "wanting" and "liking". The two are usually closely correlated. You want something, you get it, then you feel happy. The simple principle behind our entire consumer culture. But do neuroscience and our own experience really support that?

It would be too easy to point out times when people want things, get them, and then later realize they weren't so great. That could be a simple case of misunderstanding the object's true utility. What about wanting something, getting it, realizing it's not so great, and then wanting it just as much the next day? Or what about not wanting something, getting it, realizing it makes you very happy, and then continuing not to want it?

The first category, "things you do even though you don't like them very much" sounds like many drug addictions. Smokers may enjoy smoking, and they may want to avoid the physiological signs of withdrawl, but neither of those is enough to explain their reluctance to quit smoking. I don't smoke, but I made the mistake of starting a can of Pringles yesterday. If you asked me my favorite food, there are dozens of things I would say before "Pringles". Right now, and for the vast majority of my life, I feel no desire to go and get Pringles. But once I've had that first chip, my motivation for a second chip goes through the roof, without my subjective assessment of how tasty Pringles are changing one bit.

Think of the second category as "things you procrastinate even though you like them." I used to think procrastination applied only to things you disliked but did anyway. Then I tried to write a novel. I loved writing. Every second I was writing, I was thinking "This is so much fun". And I never got past the second chapter, because I just couldn't motivate myself to sit down and start writing. Other things in this category for me: going on long walks, doing yoga, reading fiction. I can know with near certainty that I will be happier doing X than Y, and still go and do Y.

Neuroscience provides some basis for this. A University of Michigan study analyzed the brains of rats eating a favorite food. They found separate circuits for "wanting" and "liking", and were able to knock out either circuit without affecting the other (it was actually kind of cute - they measured the number of times the rats licked their lips as a proxy for "liking", though of course they had a highly technical rationale behind it). When they knocked out the "liking" system, the rats would eat exactly as much of the food without making any of the satisifed lip-licking expression, and areas of the brain thought to be correlated with pleasure wouldn't show up in the MRI. Knock out "wanting", and the rats seem to enjoy the food as much when they get it but not be especially motivated to seek it out. To quote the science1:

Pleasure and desire circuitry have intimately connected but distinguishable neural substrates. Some investigators believe that the role of the mesolimbic dopamine system is not primarily to encode pleasure, but "wanting" i.e. incentive-motivation. On this analysis, endomorphins and enkephalins - which activate mu and delta opioid receptors most especially in the ventral pallidum - are most directly implicated in pleasure itself. Mesolimbic dopamine, signalling to the ventral pallidum, mediates desire. Thus "dopamine overdrive", whether natural or drug-induced, promotes a sense of urgency and a motivation to engage with the world, whereas direct activation of mu opioid receptors in the ventral pallidum induces emotionally self-sufficient bliss.

The wanting system is activated by dopamine, and the liking system is activated by opioids. There are enough connections between them that there's a big correlation in their activity, but the correlation isn't one and in fact activation of the opioids is less common than the dopamine. Another quote:

It's relatively hard for a brain to generate pleasure, because it needs to activate different opioid sites together to make you like something more. It's easier to activate desire, because a brain has several 'wanting' pathways available for the task. Sometimes a brain will like the rewards it wants. But other times it just wants them.

So you could go through all that trouble to find a black market brain surgeon who'll wirehead you, and you'll end up not even being happy. You'll just really really want to keep the wirehead circuit running.

Problem: large chunks of philosophy and economics are based upon wanting and liking being the same thing.

By definition, if you choose X over Y, then X is a higher utility option than Y. That means utility represents wanting and not liking. But good utilitarians (and, presumably, artificial intelligences) try to maximize utility (or do they?). This correlates contingently with maximizing happiness, but not necessarily. In a worst-case scenario, it might not correlate at all - two possible such scenarios being wireheading and an AI without the appropriate common sense.

Thus the deep and heavy ramifications. A more down-to-earth example came to mind when I was reading something by Steven Landsburg recently (not recommended). I don't have the exact quote, but it was something along the lines of:

According to a recent poll, two out of three New Yorkers say that, given the choice, they would rather live somewhere else. But all of them have the choice, and none of them live anywhere else. A proper summary of the results of this poll would be: two out of three New Yorkers lie on polls.

This summarizes a common strain of thought in economics, the idea of "revealed preferences". People tend to say they like a lot of things, like family or the environment or a friendly workplace. Many of the same people who say these things then go and ignore their families, pollute, and take high-paying but stressful jobs. The traditional economic explanation is that the people's actions reveal their true preferences, and that all the talk about caring about family and the environment is just stuff people say to look good and gain status. If a person works hard to get lots of money, spends it on an iPhone, and doesn't have time for their family, the economist will say that this proves that they value iPhones more than their family, no matter what they may say to the contrary.

The difference between enjoyment and motivation provides an argument that could rescue these people. It may be that a person really does enjoy spending time with their family more than they enjoy their iPhone, but they're more motivated to work and buy iPhones than they are to spend time with their family. If this were true, people's introspective beliefs and public statements about their values would be true as far as it goes, and their tendency to work overtime for an iPhone would be as much a "hijacking" of their "true preferences" as a revelation of them. This accords better with my introspective experience, with happiness research, and with common sense than the alternative.

Not that the two explanations are necessarily entirely contradictory. One could come up with a story about how people are motivated to act selfishly but enjoy acting morally, which allows them to tell others a story about how virtuous they are while still pursuing their own selfish gain.

Go too far toward the liking direction, and you risk something different from wireheading only in that the probe is stuck in a different part of the brain. Go too far in the wanting direction, and you risk people getting lots of shiny stuff they thought they wanted but don't actually enjoy. So which form of good should altruists, governments, FAIs, and other agencies in the helping people business respect?

Sources/Further Reading:

1. Wireheading.com, especially on a particular University of Michigan study

2. New York Times: A Molecule of Motivation, Dopamine Excels at its Task

3. Slate: The Powerful and Mysterious Brain Circuitry...

4. Related journal articles (1, 2, 3)

Comments

sorted by
magical algorithm
Highlighting new comments since Today at 12:40 PM
Select new highlight date
All comments loaded

Interesting article, but these really bugged me:

1) Using the environment as an example of false revealed preference. One person's pollution never ruins "the environment", at least not "their environment". The environment is only ruined by the aggregate effects of many people's pollution; or, the person is massively polluting a different environment.

Environmental solutions require collective agreement and enforcement, not unilateral disarmament. So polluting while claiming to value the environment is not hypocrisy even in the conventional sense of the term (that you criticize here).

And this is at least the second time I've explained this to you. Please stop using it as an example.

2) This phrasing:

There are enough connections between them that there's a big correlation in their activity, but the correlation isn't one ...

That initially reads like you're saying "the correlation isn't a correlation" so I had to re-read it. I recommend using any of the following terms as a replacement for the bolded word: perfect, unity, 1.0, 1, or "equal to one", any of which would have been clearer.

(Btw, I agree with your disrecommendation of Landsburg!)

I really like your point about the environment. I am wondering if you can make a broader post discussing that kind of reasoning. For example, could one argue using this logic that an individual voter makes no difference, therefore voting, on the individual level, is pointless? (The solution would be to organize massive groups of people that would vote the same way.) What other examples fall under this reasoning? And what are some examples that seem like they should fall under this reasoning, but don't?

Thanks for bringing that up. I've actually argued the opposite in the case of voting. Using timeless decision theory, you can justify voting (even without causing a bunch of people to go along with you) on the grounds that, if you would make this decision, the like-minded would reason the same way. (See my post "real-world newcomb-like problems".)

I think a crucial difference between the two cases is that non-pollution makes it even more profitable for others to pollute, which would make collective non-pollution (in the absence of a collective agreement) an unstable node. (For example, using less oil bids down the price and extends the scope of profitable uses.)

Getting this point across is difficult, and it's a common problem. For example, I'm from Norway and favor the system we have here with comparatively high taxes on the high earners, and high benefits. When I discuss economics with people from other political systems, say Americans, invariably I get a version of the same:

If I'm happy to pay higher taxes, then I can do that in USA too -- I can just donate to charities of my choice. As an added bonus, this would let me pick which charities I care most about.

The problem is the same as the polluting though: By donating to charities, I reduce the need for government-intervention, which again reduces the need for taxes, which mostly benefit those people paying most taxes.

That is, by donating to charities, I reward those people who earn well and (imho) "should" contribute more to society (by donating themselves) but don't.

So that situation is unstable: The higher the fraction of needed-support is paid for trough charitable giving, the larger is the reward for not giving.

Oh, I see! I missed the key factor that by playing strategy NOT X (not polluting) you make strategy X (polluting) more favorable for others. And, of course, that doesn't apply to voting. This helps draw the line for what kind of problems you can use this reasoning. Thanks for clarifying!

It does apply to voting. The fewer the number of voters, the more valuable an individual vote is....

I've seen a fair amount of happiness research, and happiness tends towards the "liking" end of the scale. What makes people happy is giving to charity, meditating, long walks, and so on; what makes people unhappy is commuting, work stress, and child-rearing. Religion, old age, and living in Utah also make people happy.

A life designed to maximize happiness, according to happiness researchers, would not be a hedonistic orgy, as one might imagine. You are actually happier with a fair degree of self-restraint. But it would have a lot more peaceful hobbies and fewer grand, stressful goals (like strenuous careers and parenthood.) To me, the happiness-optimized life does not sound fun. It is not something I would look forward to with anticipation and eagerness. Statistically speaking, we'd like such a life, but we wouldn't want it. Myself, I'd rather be given what I want than what would make me happy.

Wow, this is unexpected in so many levels for me. You have access to happiness research yet you would stick to what you want instead. I don't mean to insult or think there is anything wrong, I'm just genuinely staggered at the fact.

I have read some thousands of pgs in happiness research, and started to follow advice. I'm more generous, I take long walks, I cherish friendships, I care very little for a long career, I go to evolutionary envinroments all the time (the park, swimming pools and beaches) I pursue objectives which really ought to make me say "I was doing something I consider important" and ignore money, having children, and some parts of familial obligations.

We had the same info, and we took such different paths...... this is awesome.

So I suppose I am much happier but am in a constant struggle not to want lots of things that I naturally would. So I'm in a kind of strenuous effort of self-control leading to constant bliss. I suppose that you are less happier (though probably not in any way perceivable from a first person perspective) but way more relaxed, prone to be guided by your desires and wishes, and willing to actually go there and do that thing you feel like doing.....

I wish I was you for two weeks or something, if only that were possible, and then I came back....

Living in Utah does not make people happy.

Great post. It raised a question for me: why did evolution give us the pleasure mechanism at all, if the urge mechanism is sufficient to make us do stuff?

The "urge" mechanism does not help us learn to do rewarding things.

I agree that pleasure has something to do with learning, but I don't see why the "urge" or "desire" mechanism couldn't help us learn to do rewarding things without the existence of pleasure.

Without pleasure, things could work like this: If X is good for the animal, make the animal do X more often.

With pleasure, like this: If X is good for the animal, make the animal feel pleasure. Make the animal seek pleasure. (Therefore the animal will do X more often.)

So pleasure would seem to be a kind of buffer. My guess is that its purpose is to reduce the number of modifications to the animal's desires, thereby reducing the likelihood of mistaken modifications, which would be impossible to override.

Thus wanting (motivation) is near, liking (enjoyment) is far (dopamine is near, opioids are far!). If liking doesn't have the power to make you actually do things, its role is primarily in forming your beliefs about what you want, which leads to presenting good images of yourself to others with sincerity.

So far, this is not a disagreement with "revealed preferences" thought. The disagreement would come in value judgment, where instead of taking the side of wanting (as economists seem to), or the side of liking (naive view, or one of the many varieties of moral ideologies), one carefully considers the virtues on case-to-case basis, being open to discard parts from either category. True preference is neither revealed nor felt.

By definition, if you choose X over Y, then X is a higher utility option than Y. That means utility represents wanting and not liking. But good utilitarians (and, presumably, artificial intelligences) try to maximize utility. This correlates contingently with maximizing happiness, but not necessarily

You are equivocating on the term 'utility' here, as have so many other commenters before in this forum. In the first sentence above, 'utility' is used in the sense given to that term by axiomatic utility theory. When the preferences of an individual conform to a set of axioms, they can be represented by a 'utility function'. The 'utilities' of this individual are the values of that function. By contrast, when ethicists discuss utilitarianism, what they mean by 'utility' is either pleasure or good. The empirical studies you cite, therefore, do not pose problems for utility theory or utilitarianism. They only pose problems for the muddled view on which utility functions represent that which hedonistic utilitarians think we ought to maximize.

The first category, "things you do even though you don't like them very much" sounds like many drug addictions.

It's not limited to drugs or even similar physical stimuli like tasty food; according to my personal experience you can get the same effect with computer games. There's games that can be plenty of fun in the beginning (while you're learning what works), but stop being so once you abstract from that to a simple set of rules by which you can (usually) win, but nevertheless stay quite addictive in the latter phase. Whenever I play Dungeon Crawl Stone Soup for more than a few hours, I inevitably end up at a point where I don't even need to verbally think about what I'm doing for 95%+ of the wall-clock time spent playing, but that doesn't make it much easier to quit.

Popular vocabulary suggests that this is a fairly common effect.

Agree 100%. I just played a flash game last night and then again this morning, because I "just wanted to finish it." The challenge was gone, I had it all figured out, and there was nothing left but the mopping up ... which took three hours of my life. At the end of it, I told myself, "Well, that was a waste of time." But I was also glad to have completed the task.

It's probably a very good thing that I've never tried any drug stronger than alcohol.

I noticed the distinction between wanting and liking as a result of my meditation practice. I began to derive great pleasure from very simple things, like the quality of an intake of breath, or the color combination of trees and sky.

And, I began to notice a significant decrease in compulsive wanting, such as for excess food, and for any amount of alcohol.

I also noticed a significant decrease in my startle reflex.

Similar results have been reported from Davidson's lab at the University of Wisconsin. http://psyphz.psych.wisc.edu/

You just convinced me to take up meditation again. :-)

A University of Michigan study analyzed the brains of rats eating a favorite food. They found separate circuits for "wanting" and "liking", and were able to knock out either circuit without affecting the other (it was actually kind of cute - they measured the number of times the rats licked their lips as a proxy for "liking", though of course they had a highly technical rationale behind it).

One could come up with a story about how people are motivated to act selfishly but enjoy acting morally, which allows them to tell others a story about how virtuous they are while still pursuing their own selfish gain.

Rats! The neuroscientists were studying rats. It is troubling how easy it is to come up with these signalling stories to explain whatever observations we encounter.

What explanation can be suggested for a different mechanism for enjoying a food than the one for motivation to get food that doesn't rely on impressing our little rat friends with our culinary sophistication?

The other problem here is distinguishing pleasure, fun, and happiness.

As I understand wireheading, it's equivalent to experiencing a lengthy orgasm. I would describe an orgasm as pleasurable, but it seems inaccurate to call it "fun", or to call the state of experiencing an orgasm as "happiness".

For the record, the actual Landsburg quote is

In one recent survey, 39 percent of New Yorkers said they would leave the city "if they could"! Every one of them was in New York on the day of the interview, so we know that at a minimum, 39 percent of New Yorkers lie to pollsters.

page 63 of his latest book The Big Questions.

Although I'm generally a big fan of Landsburg, this seems much more a case of confusion over what "leave the city" and "if you can" mean than one of lying.

I was reading More Sex is Safer Sex, so he must like using this anecdote a lot.

I will need to go back through this again, but as a DD person, I know that my ability to motivate myself to learn new things was astronomical compared to after I destroyed most of the dopaminergic systems in my head with Drug Abuse.

The largest area I have noticed is in painting and sculpting. Two areas where I used to spend inordinate amounts of time practicing/doing. I used to have the vast majority of my work-spaces covered with miniatures and sculptures that I was working on. Now... I have a hard time getting motivated to just get them out (which is I think most of the problem).

I do know that it is possible for me to mechanically activate the motivation to perform these tasks (and I am on medication that is supposed to help, but I get the feeling it isn't), just like the rats were lacking motivation to eat when their "wanting" circuits were knocked out.

Thanks for the article. I will need to dig through some posts on another forum where I recently posted a link to a paper about modifying the brains of people with obsessive-compulsions (Drug Addicts mostly) who were able to knock out the wanting to do drugs part of their brain... I'll post the title and a link as soon as I can find the name of it. It talks about some of the same things (I think it is a U of Mich. study as well)

On a related note, it seems people do not use 'happy' and 'unhappy' as opposite, at least when they're referring to a whole life. Rather, happiness involves normative notions (a good life) whereas being unhappy is simply about endorphins.

http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/experimental_philosophy/2009/12/can-.html

Culturally it may generally be considered too much of a blow to ever say someone is unhappy in general, or has an unhappy life. Or it may be too depressing for the people themselves to think, that the other person was unhappy, is unhappy, and will continue to be unhappy, rather than just happens to be unhappy now.

Perhaps it is true that our modest technology for altering brain states (simple wireheading, recreational drugs, magnetic stimulation, etc.) leads only to stimulation of the "wanting" centers of the brain and to simple (though at times intense) pleasurable sensations. On the other hand though, it seems almost inevitable that as the secrets of the brain are progressively unlocked, and as our ability to manipulate the brain grows, it will be possible to generate all sorts of brain states, including those "higher" ones associated with love, accomplishment, fulfillment, joy, religious experiences, insight, bliss, tranquility and so on. Hence, while your analysis appears to be quite relevant with regard to wireheading today, I am skeptical that it is likely to apply much to the brain technology that could exist 50 years from now.

Great post! I completely agree with the criticism of revealed preferences in economics.

As a hedonistic utilitarian, I can't quite understand why we would favor anything other than the "liking" response. Converting the universe to utilitronium producing real pleasure is my preferred outcome. (And fortunately, there's enough of a connection between my "wanting" and "liking" systems that I want this to happen!)

The big point I took away from this article is that wanting and liking are different, and thus we should be skeptical of "revealed preferences".

But the title seemed to imply that the article wanted to address the question of whether or not we should wirehead. The last paragraph seems to argue that we should be really careful with wireheading, because we could get it wrong and not really know that we got it wrong.

Go too far toward the liking direction, and you risk something different from wireheading only in that the probe is stuck in a different part of the brain. Go too far in the wanting direction, and you risk people getting lots of shiny stuff they thought they wanted but don't actually enjoy. So which form of good should altruists, governments, FAIs, and other agencies in the helping people business respect?

I agree with this, but given that it's a central argument of the article, I think it could use a longer explanation.

I'm a neuroscience major and have known about the different circuits for liking vs. wanting. And it's always been a belief of mine that people's revealed preferences are often times just wrong, and that this is huge problem with our economy. But somehow I never connected this to the liking/wanting circuits being different. Thanks!

My grandma always assumes that if I don't want to have [some kind of food] right now, that means I don't like it.

I don't smoke, but I made the mistake of starting a can of Pringles yesterday. If you >asked me my favorite food, there are dozens of things I would say before "Pringles". >Right now, and for the vast majority of my life, I feel no desire to go and get Pringles. >But once I've had that first chip, my motivation for a second chip goes through the >roof, without my subjective assessment of how tasty Pringles are changing one bit.

What is missing from this is the effort (which eats up the limited willpower budget) required to get the second Pringle chip. Your motivation for a second Pringle chip would be much lower if you only brought one bag of Pringle chips, and all bags contained one chip. However, your motivation to have another classof(Pringle) = potato chip no doubt rises -- due to the fact that chips are on your thoughts rather than iPhones.

Talking about effort allows us to bring in habits into the discussion, which you might define as sets of actions that, due to their frequent use, are much less effort to perform.

The difference between enjoyment and motivation provides an argument that could >rescue these people. It may be that a person really does enjoy spending time with >their family more than they enjoy their iPhone, but they're more motivated to work >and buy iPhones than they are to spend time with their family.

Alternatively, for potentially good reasons before (working hard to buy a house for said family), work has become habitual while spending time with the family has not. Hence, work is the default set of actions, the default no-effort state, and anything that takes time off work requires effort. Spending time with the family could do this, yet buying an iPhone with the tons of money this person has would not.

A way of summarizing the effect of effort is that it is a function of a particular persons set of no-effort (no willpower) actions. This function defines how much 'wanting' is required to do that action -- less effort actions of the same amount of 'wanting' are more 'desirable' to be done.

Willpower plays a big role in this in that you can spend willpower to pull yourself out of the default state (a default state such as being in New York), but it only last so long.

It's hard to track down specific things from that wireheading.com site, but this seems to be a good overview. Of particular note are a couple of excerpts:

The results of these experiments indicate that reinforcing brain stimulation may have two distinct effects: (a) it activates pathways related to natural drives, and (b) it stimulates reinforcement pathways normally activated by natural rewards. The empirical observations seem to contradict classic "drive-reduction" theories of reinforcement (reinforcement appears to be associated with increased drive in the EBS paradigm). However, it is not difficult to construct a plausible alternate hypothesis: Animals may self-stimulate because the stimulation provides the experience of an intense drive that is instantly reduced due to the concurrent activation of related reward neurons. This interpretation accounts neatly for many of the apparent paradoxes we have already encountered. Priming is necessary, according to this interpretation, because EBS reinforcement not only activates reward pathways but also provides the reason why that should be pleasurable (Deutsch, 1976). (This also accounts for rapid extinction, as well as the decreased efficacy of intermittent reinforcement.) The hypothesis assumes that the reinforcing properties of EBS are determined by the degree of activation of related motivational systems. It therefore accounts readily for the observed interactions between the reinforcing properties of a stimulus and various experimental conditions that affect related primary drives such as hunger. When there is little endogenous activity, for instance immediately after a meal, the stimulation elicits only a small amount of drive-related activity. Concurrent activation of related reward circuits therefore can produce only a small reinforcement effect. When hunger-related neural pathways are already active because of deprivation, the same stimulation elicits more drive and hence more reinforcement. Indeed, it may arouse the drive system sufficiently to elicit consumatory behavior that further potentiates the reinforcing effects of the electrical stimulation.

...

It is interesting to note that while the animal literature suggests that brain stimulation has positive, reinforcing effects, the human literature indicates that relief of anxiety, depression and other unpleasant affective conditions may be the most common "reward" of electrical brain stimulation in humans. Patients with electrodes in the septum, thalamus, and periventricular gray of the midbrain often express euphoria because the stimulation seems to reduce existing negative affective reactions (even intractable pain appears to loose its affective impact). However, many psychiatrists caution that this may not reflect an activation of a basic reward mechanism (Delgado, 1976; Heath et al., 1968). Relief from chronic anxiety has been reported during and even long after stimulation of frontal cortex. Again, the experiential response appears to be relief rather than reward per se (Crow&Cooper, 1972).

In general, it seems as though electrical brain stimulation isn't quite as effective at producing bliss as one might wish (or fear).

(Response to old post)

According to a recent poll, two out of three New Yorkers say that, given the choice, they would rather live somewhere else. But all of them have the choice, and none of them live anywhere else. A proper summary of the results of this poll would be: two out of three New Yorkers lie on polls.

Ordinary people do not interpret the statement "given the choice" to mean "under at least one circumstance where it is not physically impossible". That's not an example of revealed preferences or inconsistency--it's an example of real people not acting like Internet geeks.

as a person who plans to wirehead themselves if other positive futures don't work out I find this very interesting but unconvincing.

I was reading a free on line book "The Authoritarians" by Robert Altemeyer one of his many findings of studying fundamentalists authoritarian follower types is that many deal with the guilt of doing some thing morally wrong by asking God for forgiveness and then feel closer to "Much less guilty" then "Appreciably less guilty" it may not be a wire in the head but it should keep one from some suffering.

I also very much like Dan Gilbert's Ted talk on synthesizing happiness I use it all the time because "it really is not so bad" and "it turned out for the best"