Recently Ben Kuhn wrote a critique of effective altruism. I'm glad to see such self-examination taking place, but I'm also concerned that the essay did not attack some of the most serious issues I see in the effective altruist movement, so I've decided to write my own critique. Due to time constraints, this critique is short and incomplete. I've tried to bring up arguments that would make people feel uncomfortable and defensive; hopefully I've succeeded.
Briefly, here are some of the major issues I have with the effective altruism movement as it currently stands:
-
Over-focus on “tried and true” and “default” options, which may both reduce actual impact and decrease exploration of new potentially high-value opportunities.
-
Over-confident claims coupled with insufficient background research.
-
Over-reliance on a small set of tools for assessing opportunities, which lead many to underestimate the value of things such as “flow-through” effects.
The common theme here is a subtle underlying message that simple, shallow analyses can allow one to make high-impact career and giving choices, and divest one of the need to dig further. I doubt that anyone explicitly believes this, but I do believe that this theme comes out implicitly both in arguments people make and in actions people take.
Lest this essay give a mistaken impression to the casual reader, I should note that there are many examplary effective altruists who I feel are mostly immune to the issues above; for instance, the GiveWell blog does a very good job of warning against the first and third points above, and I would recommend anyone who isn't already to subscribe to it (and there are other examples that I'm failing to mention). But for the purposes of this essay, I will ignore this fact except for the current caveat.
Over-focus on "tried and true" options
It seems to me that the effective altruist movement over-focuses on “tried and true” options, both in giving opportunities and in career paths. Perhaps the biggest example of this is the prevalence of “earning to give”. While this is certainly an admirable option, it should be considered as a baseline to improve upon, not a definitive answer.
The biggest issue with the “earning to give” path is that careers in finance and software (the two most common avenues for this) are incredibly straight-forward and secure. The two things that finance and software have in common is that there is a well-defined application process similar to the one for undergraduate admissions, and given reasonable job performance one will continue to be given promotions and raises (this probably entails working hard, but the end result is still rarely in doubt). One also gets a constant source of extrinsic positive reinforcement from the money they earn. Why do I call these things an “issue”? Because I think that these attributes encourage people to pursue these paths without looking for less obvious, less certain, but ultimately better paths. One in six Yale graduates go into finance and consulting, seemingly due to the simplicity of applying and the easy supply of extrinsic motivation. My intuition is that this ratio is higher than an optimal society would have, even if such people commonly gave generously (and it is certainly much higher than the number of people who enter college planning to pursue such paths).
Contrast this with, for instance, working at a start-up. Most start-ups are low-impact, but it is undeniable that at least some have been extraordinarily high-impact, so this seems like an area that effective altruists should be considering strongly. Why aren't there more of us at 23&me, or Coursera, or Quora, or Stripe? I think it is because these opportunities are less obvious and take more work to find, once you start working it often isn't clear whether what you're doing will have a positive impact or not, and your future job security is massively uncertain. There are few sources of extrinsic motivation in such a career: perhaps moreso at one of the companies mentioned above, which are reasonably established and have customers, but what about the 4-person start-up teams working in a warehouse somewhere? Some of them will go on to do great things but right now their lives must be full of anxiousness and uncertainty.
I don't mean to fetishize start-ups. They are just one well-known example of a potentially high-value career path that, to me, seems underexplored within the EA movement. I would argue (perhaps self-servingly) that academia is another example of such a path, with similar psychological obstacles: every 5 years or so you have the opportunity to get kicked out (e.g. applying for faculty jobs, and being up for tenure), you need to relocate regularly, few people will read your work and even fewer will praise it, and it won't be clear whether it had a positive impact until many years down the road. And beyond the “obvious” alternatives of start-ups and academia, what of the paths that haven't been created yet? GiveWell was revolutionary when it came about. Who will be the next GiveWell? And by this I don't mean the next charity evaluator, but the next set of people who fundamentally alter how we view altruism.
Over-confident claims coupled with insufficient background research
The history of effective altruism is littered with over-confident claims, many of which have later turned out to be false. In 2009, Peter Singer claimed that you could save a life for $200 (and many others repeated his claim). While the number was already questionable at the time, by 2011 we discovered that the number was completely off. Now new numbers were thrown around: from numbers still in the hundreds of dollars (GWWC's estimate for SCI, which was later shown to be flawed) up to $1600 (GiveWell's estimate for AMF, which GiveWell itself expected to go up, and which indeed did go up). These numbers were often cited without caveats, as well as other claims such as that the effectiveness of charities can vary by a factor of 1,000. How many people citing these numbers understood the process that generated them, or the high degree of uncertainty surrounding them, or the inaccuracy of past estimates? How many would have pointed out that saying that charities vary by a factor of 1,000 in effectiveness is by itself not very helpful, and is more a statement about how bad the bottom end is than how good the top end is?
More problematic than the careless bandying of numbers is the tendency toward not doing strong background research. A common pattern I see is: an effective altruist makes a bold claim, then when pressed on it offers a heuristic justification together with the claim that “estimation is the best we have”. This sort of argument acts as a conversation-stopper (and can also be quite annoying, which may be part of what drives some people away from effective altruism). In many of these cases, there are relatively easy opportunities to do background reading to further educate oneself about the claim being made. It can appear to an outside observer as though people are opting for the fun, easy activity (speculation) rather than the harder and more worthwhile activity (research). Again, I'm not claiming that this is people's explicit thought process, but it does seem to be what ends up happening.
Why haven't more EAs signed up for a course on global security, or tried to understand how DARPA funds projects, or learned about third-world health? I've heard claims that this would be too time-consuming relative to the value it provides, but this seems like a poor excuse if we want to be taken seriously as a movement (or even just want to reach consistently accurate conclusions about the world).
Over-reliance on a small set of tools
Effective altruists tend to have a lot of interest in quantitative estimates. We want to know what the best thing to do is, and we want a numerical value. This causes us to rely on scientific studies, economic reports, and Fermi estimates. It can cause us to underweight things like the competence of a particular organization, the strength of the people involved, and other “intangibles” (which are often not actually intangible but simply difficult to assign a number to). It also can cause us to over-focus on money as a unit of altruism, while often-times “it isn't about the money”: it's about doing the groundwork that no one is doing, or finding the opportunity that no one has found yet.
Quantitative estimates often also tend to ignore flow-through effects: effects which are an indirect, rather than direct, result of an action (such as decreased disease in the third world contributing in the long run to increased global security). These effects are difficult to quantify but human and cultural intuition can do a reasonable job of taking them into account. As such, I often worry that effective altruists may actually be less effective than “normal” altruists. (One can point to all sorts of examples of farcical charities to claim that regular altruism sucks, but this misses the point that there are also amazing organizations out there, such as the Simons Foundation or HHMI, which are doing enormous amounts of good despite not subscribing to the EA philosophy.)
What's particularly worrisome is that even if we were less effective than normal altruists, we would probably still end up looking better by our own standards, which explicitly fail to account for the ways in which normal altruists might outperform us (see above). This is a problem with any paradigm, but the fact that the effective altruist community is small and insular and relies heavily on its paradigm makes us far more susceptible to it.
I'm glad to see more of this criticism as I think it's important for reflection and moving things forward. However, I'm not really sure who you're critiquing or why. My response would be that your critique (a) appears to misrepresent what the "EA mainstream" is, (b) ignores comparative advantage, or (c) says things I just outright disagree with.
~
The EA Mainstream
I imagine we know different people, even within the effective altruist community. So I'll believe you if you say you know a decent amount of people who think "earning to give" is the best instead of a baseline.
However, 80,000 Hours, the career advice organization that basically started earning to give have themselves written an article called "Why Earning to Give is Often Not the Best Option" and say "A common misconception is that 80,000 Hours thinks Earning to Give is typically the way to have the most impact. We’ve never said that in any of our materials.".
Additionally, the earning-to-give people I know (including myself) all agree with the baseline argument but believe earning to give either as best for them relative to other opportunities (e.g., using comparative advantage arguments) and/or believe earning to give to actually be best overall even when considering these arguments (e.g., by being skeptical of EA organizations).
~
I'm not quite sure what you mean by this:
If you're asking "why don't more people work in start-ups?", I don't think EAs are avoiding start-ups in any noticeable way. I'll be working in one, I know several EAs who are working in them, and it doesn't seem to be all that different from software engineers / web developers in non-startups, except as would be predicted by non start-ups providing even better hiring opportunities.
If you're asking "why don't more people start start-ups themselves?", I think you already answered your own question with regard to people being unwilling to take on high personal risk. 80,000 Hours advises people to do start-ups in essays like "Should More Altruists Consider Entreprenuership?" and "Salary or Start-up: How Do Gooders Can Gain More From Risky Careers". Also, I can think of a few EAs who have started their own start-ups on these considerations. So perhaps people are irrationally risk-averse -- that is a valid critique -- but I don't think it's unique to the EA movement or we can do much about it.
If you're asking "why don't more people go into start-ups because these start-ups are doing high impact things themselves and therefore are good opportunities to have direct impact?", then I think you've hit on a valid critique that many people don't take seriously enough. I've heard some EAs mention it, but it is outside the EA mainstream.
~
I think the EA mainstream would agree with you on this one as well -- GiveWell, for example, has explicitly distanced themselves from numerical calculations (albeit recently) and several EAs have called into question the usefulness of cost-effectiveness estimates, a charge that was largely lead by GiveWell.
~
Comparative Advantage
I definitely agree that fundamentally altering how people view altruism would be very high impact (if shifted in a beneficial way, of course). But I don't think everyone has the time, skills, or willingness to do this -- or that they even should. I think this ignores the benefits of some specialization of trade.
Likewise, instead of EAs taking classes on global security for themselves, many defer to GiveWell and expect GiveWell to perform higher-quality research on these giving opportunities. After all, if you have broad trust in GiveWell, it's hard to beat several full-time saavy analysts with your spare time. GiveWell has more comparative advantage here.
~
Right. But not everyone has the time or talents to do this groundwork. So it seems best if we set up some orgs to do this kind of groundwork (e.g., CEA, MIRI, etc.) and give money to them to let them specialize in these kinds of breakthroughs. And then the people who have the free time can start projects like Effective Fundraising or .impact.
If you're already raising a family and working a full-time job and donating 10%, I think in many cases it's not worth quitting your job or using your free time to look for more opportunities. We don't need absolutely everyone doing this search -- there's comparative advantage considerations here too.
~
Outright Disagreement
I think this has been very helpful from a PR point of view. And even if you think flow-through effects even things out more so that charities only differ by 10x or 100x (which I currently don't), that's still significant.
And whether that's condemnation of the bad end or praise for the top end depends on your perspective and standards for what makes an org good or bad. At least, the slope of the curve suggests that a lot of the difference is coming from the best organizations being a lot better than the merely good ones as opposed to the very bad ones being exceptionally bad (i.e., the curve is skewed toward the top, not toward the bottom).
~
But can it? How do you know? I think you should take your own "research over speculation" advice here. I don't think we understand flow through effects well enough yet to know if they can be reliably intuited.
~
Outright Agreement
I agree this is an unfortunate problem.
~
Conclusion
This is where I get to the question of who your intended audience is. It seems like the EA mainstream either agrees with many of your critiques already (and therefore you're just trying to convince EAs to adopt the mainstream) or you're placing too much burden on EAs to ignore comparative advantage and have everyone become an EA trailblazer.
I'll speak up on this one. I am a booster of more such estimates, detailed enough to make assumptions and reasoning explicit. Quantifying one's assumptions lets other challenge the pieces individually and make progress, where with a wishy-washy "list of considerations pro and con" there is a lot of wiggle room about their strengths. Sometimes doing this forces one to think through an argument more deeply only to discover big holes, or that the key pieces also come up in the context of other problems.
In prediction tournaments training people to use formal probabilities has been helpful for their accuracy.
Also I second the bit about comparative advantage: CEA recently hired Owen Cotton-Barratt to do cause prioritization/flow-through effects related work. GiveWell Labs is heavily focused on it. Nick Beckstead and others at the FHI also do some work on the topic.
I think that on some of these questions there is also real variation in opinion that should not simply be summarized as a clear "mainstream" position.