In reply to:

Considering that medical errors apparently kill more people than car accidents each year in the United States, I suspect the establishment is not in fact infallible.

Citation needed? I know I'm coming to this rather late, but a quick check of the 2010 CDC report on deaths in the US gives "Complications of medical and surgical care" as causing 2,490 deaths whereas transport accidents causing 37,961 deaths (35,332 of which were classified a 'motor vehicle deaths'). The only other thing I can see that might be medical errors put under a different heading is "Accidental poisoning and exposure to noxious substances" at 33,041 which combines to still fewer deaths than transport accidents even without removing those poisonings which are not medical errors. (This poisoning category appears to have a lot of recreational drug overdoses judging by the way it sharply increases in the 15-24 age group then drops off after 54 whereas time-spent-in-hospital is presumably increasing with age.)

On the other hand, a 2012 New York Times Op-Ed claims 98,000 deaths from medical errors a year. This number is so much larger than what the CDC reports that I must be misreading something. That would be about 1 in 20 people who die in the US die due to medical error. Original source from 1999). Actually checking that source, 98,000 deaths/year is the upper bound number given (lower bound of 44,000 deaths/year). The report also recommends a 50% reduction in these deaths within 5 years (so by 2004) - and Wikipedia mentions a 2006 study claiming that they successfully preventing 120,000 deaths in an 18 month time period but I can't find this study. A 2001 followup here appears to focus on suggestions for improvements rather than on giving new data to our question. 3 minutes on Google Scholar didn't turn up any recent estimates. This entire sub-field appears to rely very heavily upon that one source - at least in the US.

Also of interest is "Actual Causes of Death in the US" which classifies deaths by 'mistake made' (so to speak) - the top killer being tobacco use, then poor diet/low exercise, alcohol, microbial agents, toxic agents, car accidents, firearms, sexual behaviors, and illicit drug use. Medical errors didn't show high up on this list, despite it being the only source in the Wikipedia article on the original article.

Edit: also some places that cite the 1999 study accuse the CDC of not reporting these deaths as their own category. This appears to have changed given the category I reported above. The fact that there has been substantial uproar about medical error since the 1999 article and a corresponding increase in funding for studying it makes me unsurprised that the CDC would start reporting.

Your Strength as a Rationalist

(The following happened to me in an IRC chatroom, long enough ago that I was still hanging around in IRC chatrooms.  Time has fuzzed the memory and my report may be imprecise.)

So there I was, in an IRC chatroom, when someone reports that a friend of his needs medical advice.  His friend says that he's been having sudden chest pains, so he called an ambulance, and the ambulance showed up, but the paramedics told him it was nothing, and left, and now the chest pains are getting worse.  What should his friend do?

I was confused by this story.  I remembered reading about homeless people in New York who would call ambulances just to be taken someplace warm, and how the paramedics always had to take them to the emergency room, even on the 27th iteration.  Because if they didn't, the ambulance company could be sued for lots and lots of money.  Likewise, emergency rooms are legally obligated to treat anyone, regardless of ability to pay.  (And the hospital absorbs the costs, which are enormous, so hospitals are closing their emergency rooms...  It makes you wonder what's the point of having economists if we're just going to ignore them.)  So I didn't quite understand how the described events could have happened.  Anyone reporting sudden chest pains should have been hauled off by an ambulance instantly.

And this is where I fell down as a rationalist.  I remembered several occasions where my doctor would completely fail to panic at the report of symptoms that seemed, to me, very alarming.  And the Medical Establishment was always right.  Every single time.  I had chest pains myself, at one point, and the doctor patiently explained to me that I was describing chest muscle pain, not a heart attack.  So I said into the IRC channel, "Well, if the paramedics told your friend it was nothing, it must really be nothing—they'd have hauled him off if there was the tiniest chance of serious trouble."

Thus I managed to explain the story within my existing model, though the fit still felt a little forced...

Later on, the fellow comes back into the IRC chatroom and says his friend made the whole thing up.  Evidently this was not one of his more reliable friends.

I should have realized, perhaps, that an unknown acquaintance of an acquaintance in an IRC channel might be less reliable than a published journal article.  Alas, belief is easier than disbelief; we believe instinctively, but disbelief requires a conscious effort.

So instead, by dint of mighty straining, I forced my model of reality to explain an anomaly that never actually happened.  And I knew how embarrassing this was.  I knew that the usefulness of a model is not what it can explain, but what it can't.  A hypothesis that forbids nothing, permits everything, and thereby fails to constrain anticipation.

Your strength as a rationalist is your ability to be more confused by fiction than by reality.  If you are equally good at explaining any outcome, you have zero knowledge.

We are all weak, from time to time; the sad part is that I could have been stronger.  I had all the information I needed to arrive at the correct answer, I even noticed the problem, and then I ignored it.  My feeling of confusion was a Clue, and I threw my Clue away.

I should have paid more attention to that sensation of still feels a little forced. It's one of the most important feelings a truthseeker can have, a part of your strength as a rationalist.  It is a design flaw in human cognition that this sensation manifests as a quiet strain in the back of your mind, instead of a wailing alarm siren and a glowing neon sign reading "EITHER YOUR MODEL IS FALSE OR THIS STORY IS WRONG."

 

Part of the sequence Mysterious Answers to Mysterious Questions

Next post: "Absence of Evidence Is Evidence of Absence"

Previous post: "The Virtue of Narrowness"

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Anon, see Why Truth?:

When people think of "emotion" and "rationality" as opposed, I suspect that they are really thinking of System 1 and System 2 - fast perceptual judgments versus slow deliberative judgments. Deliberative judgments aren't always true, and perceptual judgments aren't always false; so it is very important to distinguish that dichotomy from "rationality". Both systems can serve the goal of truth, or defeat it, according to how they are used.

A valid point, Psy-Kosh, but I've seen this happen to a friend too. She was walking along the streets one night when a strange blur appeared across her vision, with bright floating objects. Then she was struck by a massive headache. I had her write down what the blur looked like, and she put down strange half-circles missing their left sides.

That point was when I really started to get worried, because it looked like lateral neglect - something that I'd heard a lot about, in my studies of neurology, as a symptom of lateralized brain damage from strokes.

The funny thing was, nobody in the medical profession seemed to think this was a problem. The medical advice line from her health insurance said it was a "yellow light" for which she should see a doctor in the next day or two. Yellow light?! With a stroke, you have to get the right medication within the first three hours to prevent permanent brain damage! So we went to the emergency room - reluctantly, because California has enormously overloaded emergency rooms - and the nurse who signed us in certainly didn't seem to think those symptoms were very alarming.

The thing is, of course, that non-doctors are legally prohibited from making diagnoses. So neither the nurse on the advice line, or the nurse who signed us into the emergency room, were allowed to say: "It's a migraine headache, you idiots."

You see, I'd heard the phrase "migraine headache", but I'd had no idea of what the symptoms of a "migraine headache" were. My studies in neurology told me about strokes and lateral brain damage, because those are very important to the study of functional neuroanatomy. So I knew about these super dangerous and rare killer events that seemed sort of like the symptoms we were encountering, but I didn't know about the common events that a doctor sees every day.

When you see symptoms, you think of lethal zebras, because those are what you read about in the newspapers. The doctor thinks of much less exciting horses. This is why the Medical Establishment has always been right, in my experience, every single time I'm alarmed and they're not.

But in answer to your question about selection effects, Psy-Kosh, I think I'd have noticed if my friend had actually had a stroke. In fact, it would have been much more likely to have been reported and repeated than the reverse case.

"And this is where I fell down as a rationalist. I remembered several occasions where my doctor would completely fail to panic at the report of symptoms that seemed, to me, very alarming. And the Medical Establishment was always right. Every single time. I had chest pains myself, at one point, and the doctor patiently explained to me that I was describing chest muscle pain, not a heart attack. So I said into the IRC channel, "Well, if the paramedics told your friend it was nothing, it must really be nothing - they'd have hauled him off if there was the tiniest chance of serious trouble.""

My own "hold on a second" detector is pinging mildly at that particular bit. Specifically, isn't there a touch of an observer selection effect there? If the docs had been wrong and you ended up dying as a result, you wouldn't have been around to make that deduction, so you're (Well, anyone is) effectively biased to retroactively observe outcomes in which if the doctor did say you're not in a life threatening situation, you're genuinely not?

Or am I way off here?

"I should have paid more attention to that sensation of still feels a little forced."

The force that you would have had to counter was the impetus to be polite. In order to boldly follow your models, you would have had to tell the person on the other end of the chat that you didn't believe his friend. You could have less boldly held your tongue, but that wouldn't have satisfied your drive to understand what was going on. Perhaps a compromise action would have been to point out the unlikelihood, (which you did: "they'd have hauled him off if there was the tiniest chance of serious trouble"), and ask for a report on the eventual outcome.

Given the constraints of politeness, I don't know how you can do better. If you were talking to people who knew you better, and understood your viewpoint on rationality, you might expect to be forgiven for giving your bald assessment of the unlikeliness of the report.

Not necessarily.

You can assume the paramedics did not follow the proper procedure, and that his friend aught to go to the emergency room himself to verify that he is OK. People do make mistakes.

The paramedics are potentially unreliable as well, though given the litigious nature of our society I would fully expect the paramedics to be extremely reliable in taking people to the emergency room, which would still cast doubt on the friend.

Still, if you want to be polite, just say "if you are concerned, you should go to the emergency room anyway" and keep your doubts about the man's veracity to yourself. No doubt the truth would have come out at that point as well.

From TvTropes:

"According to legend, one night the students of Baron Cuvier (one of the founders of modern paleontology and comparative anatomy) decided to play a trick on their instructor. They fashioned a medley of skins, skulls and other animal parts (including the head and legs of a deer) into a credibly monstrous costume. One brave fellow then donned the chimeric assemblage, crept into the Baron's bedroom when he was asleep and growled "Cuvier, wake up! I am going to eat you!" Cuvier woke up, took one look at the deer parts that formed part of the costume and sniffed "Impossible! You have horns and hooves!" (one would think "what sort of animals have horns and hooves" is common knowledge).

More likely he was saying "Impossible! You have horns and hooves (and are therefore not not a predator.)" The prank is more commonly reported as: "Cuvier, wake up! I am the Devil! I am going to eat you!" His response was "Divided hoof; graminivorous! It cannot be done." Apparently Satan is vegan. Don't comment that some deer have been seen eating meat or entrails, I occasionally grab the last slice of my bud's pizza but that doesn't classify me as a scavenger."

Thank you, Eliezer. Now I know how to dissolve Newcomb type problems. (http://lesswrong.com/lw/nc/newcombs_problem_and_regret_of_rationality/)

I simply recite, "I just do not believe what you have told me about this intergalactic superintelligence Omega".

And of course, since I do not believe, the hypothetical questions asked by Newcomb problem enthusiasts become beneath my notice; my forming a belief about how to act rationally in this contrary-to-fact hypothetical situation cannot pay the rent.

Fair enough (upvoted); but I'm pretty sure Parfit's Hitchhiker is analogous to Newcomb's Problem, and that's an absolutely possible real-world scenario. Eliezer presents it in chapter 7 of his TDT document.

I don't see that you did anything at all irrational. You're talking to a complete stranger on the internet. He doesn't know you, and cannot have any possible interest in deceiving you. He tells you a fairly detailed story and asks for you advice. For him to make the whole thing up just for kicks is an example of highly irrational and fairly unlikely behavior.

Conversely, a person's panicking over chest pains and calling the ambulance is a comparatively frequent occurrence. Your having read somewhere something about ambulance policies does not amount to having concrete, irrefutable knowledge that an ambulance crew cannot make an on-site determination that there's no need to take a person to the hospital. To a person without extensive medical knowledge there is nothing particularly unlikely about the story you were told.

Therefore, the situation is this -- you are told by a complete stranger that has no reason to lie to you a perfectly believable story. You have no concrete reason ("read something somewhere" does not qualify) to doubt either the story or the man's sanity. Thus there is nothing illogical about taking the story at face value. You did the perfectly rational thing.

Since there was no irrationality in your initial behavior, the conclusions that you arrive at further in your post are unfounded.

DP

You're talking to a complete stranger on the internet. He doesn't know you, and cannot have any possible interest in deceiving you.

There's plenty of evidence that some people (a smallish minority, I think) will deceive strangers for the fun of it.

("read something somewhere" does not qualify)

Wait, why not?

I think one would be the closest to truth by replying: "I don't quite believe that your story is true, but if it is, you should... etc" because there is no way for you to surely know whether he was bluffing or not. You have to admit both cases are possible even if one of them is highly improbable.

In it's strongest form, not believing system 1 amounts to not believing perceptions, hence not believing in empiricism. This is possibly the oldest of philosophical mistakes, made by Plato, possibly Siddhartha, and probably others even earlier.

Considering that medical errors apparently kill more people than car accidents each year in the United States, I suspect the establishment is not in fact infallible.

Citation needed? I know I'm coming to this rather late, but a quick check of the 2010 CDC report on deaths in the US gives "Complications of medical and surgical care" as causing 2,490 deaths whereas transport accidents causing 37,961 deaths (35,332 of which were classified a 'motor vehicle deaths'). The only other thing I can see that might be medical errors put under a different heading is "Accidental poisoning and exposure to noxious substances" at 33,041 which combines to still fewer deaths than transport accidents even without removing those poisonings which are not medical errors. (This poisoning category appears to have a lot of recreational drug overdoses judging by the way it sharply increases in the 15-24 age group then drops off after 54 whereas time-spent-in-hospital is presumably increasing with age.)

On the other hand, a 2012 New York Times Op-Ed claims 98,000 deaths from medical errors a year. This number is so much larger than what the CDC reports that I must be misreading something. That would be about 1 in 20 people who die in the US die due to medical error. Original source from 1999). Actually checking that source, 98,000 deaths/year is the upper bound number given (lower bound of 44,000 deaths/year). The report also recommends a 50% reduction in these deaths within 5 years (so by 2004) - and Wikipedia mentions a 2006 study claiming that they successfully preventing 120,000 deaths in an 18 month time period but I can't find this study. A 2001 followup here appears to focus on suggestions for improvements rather than on giving new data to our question. 3 minutes on Google Scholar didn't turn up any recent estimates. This entire sub-field appears to rely very heavily upon that one source - at least in the US.

Also of interest is "Actual Causes of Death in the US" which classifies deaths by 'mistake made' (so to speak) - the top killer being tobacco use, then poor diet/low exercise, alcohol, microbial agents, toxic agents, car accidents, firearms, sexual behaviors, and illicit drug use. Medical errors didn't show high up on this list, despite it being the only source in the Wikipedia article on the original article.

Edit: also some places that cite the 1999 study accuse the CDC of not reporting these deaths as their own category. This appears to have changed given the category I reported above. The fact that there has been substantial uproar about medical error since the 1999 article and a corresponding increase in funding for studying it makes me unsurprised that the CDC would start reporting.

If a doctor makes a mistake treating a patient from a vehicle accident, what heading does it get reported under?

(I ask the question in earnest, to anybody who might know the answer - because depending on what the answer is, it could explain the discrepancy.)

It is a design flaw in human cognition that this sensation manifests as a quiet strain in the back of your mind, instead of a wailing alarm siren and a glowing neon sign reading "EITHER YOUR MODEL IS FALSE OR THIS STORY IS WRONG."

I wouldn't call it a flaw; blaring alarms can be a nuisance. Ideally you could adjust the sensitivity settings . . . hence the popularity of alcohol.

Sounds like good old cognitive dissonance. Your mental model was not matching the information being presented.

That feeling of cognitive dissonance is a piece of information to be considered in arriving at your decision. If something doesn't feel right, usually either te model or the facts are wrong or incomplete.

T

Alas, belief is easier than disbelief; we believe instinctively, but disbelief requires a conscious effort.

Looking through Google Scholar for citations of Gilbert 1990 and Gilbert 1993, I see 2 replications which question the original effect:

(While looking for those, I found some good citations for my fiction-biases section, though.)

I feel really uncomfortable with this idea: "EITHER YOUR MODEL IS FALSE OR THIS STORY IS WRONG."

I think this statement suffers from the same limitations of propositional logic; consequently, it is not applicable to many real life situations.

Most of the times, our model contains rules of this type (at least if we are rationalists): Event A occurs in situation B with probability C, where C is not 0 or 1. Also, life experiences teach us that we should update the probabilities in our model over time. So beside the uncertainty caused by the probability C, there is also uncertainty resulted from our degree of belief in the correctness of the rule itself. The situation becomes more complicated when the problem is cost sensitive.

I got your point (I hope so) and I'm definitely not trying to say "IT IS WORNG" but I think it is true to some degree.