A strange implication of critical-level utilitarianism

Suppose you have a population of  identical people, each with the same income . Critical-level utilitarianism (CLU) says that you should maximize utility above a certain "critical level" - in this case, if each person's utility function is , we want maximize  for some income level  below which you don't think life is worth living. (Critical-level utilitarianism doesn't help us pick which value of  to use, though.) To choose the optimal level of , we need to know which combinations are feasible. Cobb-Douglas production functions (which are essentially power functions) are frequently used to model how much output can be produced with a given amount of input, so I will use them here. If total income is given by the Cobb-Douglas production function , then both the average and the marginal productivity of labor are proportional to , so the average income should scale the same way. If we assume that each person's utility scales as the logarithm of their income, we get that . Optimizing, we set , so  and . Usually,  is greater than 0 but less than 1, so the optimal per-capita income ranges from the critical income level to -fold above it. A pessimistic production function with  would have an optimal per-capita income that's a factor of  above the critical level.

This calculation uncovered an interesting (to me, at least) paradox. The current variation in per-capita incomes across countries is far larger than -fold or even -fold, so according to this model, regardless of the critical income level you choose, either a lot of countries are far below the critical level (and the lives of the people in them are not worth living by a large margin), or a lot of countries are far above the optimal income level (and their populations should increase until their per-capita incomes decrease by a large amount). This implies some strange priorities: if the critical level is high, then it'd be good to reduce the population of a low-income country even if it decreases their per-capita income greatly, and if the critical level is low, poverty reduction in high-income is unimportant, since it'd be much better to increase the birth rate of poor (in high-income countries) people.

Although this model is very simple, it's fairly robust to changes in the production function or the utility function, since the differences in income between countries are so large. The major assumption I made is that CLU is reasonable. This post applies to total utilitarianism as well, since it is a special case of CLU.

What do you think? Do you agree with CLU or a similar theory? If you do, what are the problems with my model? If you agree with CLU and think this model is basically correct, what does it imply about what an effective altruist's priorities should be?

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There are several things here I fail to understand.

  1. Why d/dN? If you're looking for optimal income per capita, you need d/dw=0 not d/dN=0.

  2. The result you've allegedly reached is that w = w0 exp(alpha-1) where alpha<1, which means w<w0, which means you're not actually in the regime where net utility equals N[U(w)-U(w0)], so you've been doing calculus on the wrong formulae.

  3. Clearly utility is not only a function of income. (Even considering only money, you need to consider assets as well as income.) Of course considering only income is a handy simplification that may turn something impossibly complicated into something susceptible to analysis, but I think you should be explicit about making that simplification because the importance of things other than money is actually a pretty big deal.

  4. This all seems like a more complicated but still minor variation on simple and familiar observations like these: (a) simple versions of utilitarianism say well-off people should give almost all they have to poorer people; (b) simple versions of average utilitarianism say we should kill all the least happy people; (c) simple versions of total utilitarianism say we should prefer an enormous population of people with just-better-than-nothing lives to a normal-sized population of very happy people. I would expect solutions to (or bullet-biting on) these problems to deal with the more complicated but similarly counterintuitive conclusions presented here (assuming for the sake of argument that either my objections above are wrong or else the conclusions remain when the errors are repaired).

  1. I was unclear there - I'm finding the optimal wage at the optimal population level, not the maximum possible wage.
  2. Whoops, I meant 1-alpha. Fixed.
  3. Non-income factors are important, but I didn't consider them here because they're less obviously related to the population level.
  4. I was trying to say that even taking resource constraints, the critical income and the optimal income don't differ by that much compared to how much countries currently differ in income. Critical-level utilitarianism is supposed to be a "compromise" between total and average utilitarianism, but it would still yield strange conclusions in today's world.
  1. Oh, I see. You're taking wage to be determined by production, which in turn is determined by population according to the Cobb-Douglas formula, and then asking "what's the optimal population?". Got it.

  2. Yup, better now.

So, anyway, now that I understand your argument better, there's something that looks both important and wrong, but maybe I'm misunderstanding. You're assuming that A -- the constant factor in the Cobb-Douglas formula -- is the same for all countries. But surely it isn't, and surely this accounts for a large amount of the variation in productivity and wealth between countries. It seems like this would lead to big differences in w between countries even if they're all close to optimal population.

The A factor drops out of the final expression for the optimal wage. If the form of the production function is the same between two countries, their optimal wages will be the same as well. However, their optimal populations will obviously be different. For example, if country 1 has 10 times higher A than country 2, but their values of alpha are the same, then their optimum wages are the same, but country 1's optimum population is higher by a factor of 10^(1/(1-alpha)).

Here, A lumps together productivity and the amount of land a country has (so that a large poor country may have higher A than a small rich one). Obviously, increasing A will increase welfare, but it won't change the optimal wage (if the country is above that level already, increasing A will bring wages further away from the optimum) - the best thing to do (according to this model) is to increase A as much as possible, and also adjust the population level to match the optimal wage.

Around here, we usually treat human values as complicated.

You might take a look at the sequence of posts starting here, up until "Fake utility functions." Or see the wiki for more links.

From a logic puzzle point of view, there are plenty of things you can play with to avoid repugnant conclusions (e.g. mapping very low incomes to slightly negative utilities, etc.), but I don't think they should tell you much about effective altruism.

The measure that ericyu3 discusses maximizing is already negative for low incomes. So I don't see how "mapping very low incomes to slightly negative utilities" solves anything.

Hm, perhaps I misinterpreted it. Oh well.

If you would like some examples of anything, check out this encyclopedia article.

total utilitarianism is a special case of CLU

Can you elaborate? I'm really not seeing this.